The implications of the rise of China's military for Mongolian security by Sukhee, Bayar-Ochir.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2010-06
The implications of the rise of China's military for
Mongolian security
Sukhee, Bayar-Ochir.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISE OF CHINA’S 








 Thesis Advisor: Alice L. Miller 
 Second Reader: Victoria Clement 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2010 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
The Implications of the Rise of China’s Military for Mongolian Security 
6. AUTHOR(S) Bayar-Ochir Sukhee, LTC 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number ________________.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
China is transforming the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into an effective fighting force with power projection capability. The 
main objective has been to fill the gap between the PLA and leading military forces. China’s military forces modernization 
coincides with its rapid economic growth and growing energy and resource needs. For these reasons, the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) leaders put forward new missions of the PLA, which may include securing China’s interests abroad. This process certainly 
impacts indirectly, if not directly, Mongolia’s security. Like other countries, Mongolia does not choose its neighbors. Hence, the 
geopolitical reality of living between its large neighbors, China and Russia, thus defines its fundamental security interests. Though 
Beijing is not likely to use force against Mongolia, and China and Mongolia currently enjoy friendly relations, it is uncertain how 
long this will last. Despite having no immediate external threat, China has continued modernizing its military with great ambiguity.  
Therefore, not only Mongolia, but also Western countries, including the United States, are wondering why China is pursuing these 
ambitious military modernization effort.   
Mongolia’s underdeveloped economy, small population, absence of financial and technological capabilities, and rich 
natural resources certainly attract both big neighbors’ attention. In particular, China has a particular interest, since its economic 
development requires lots of energy and resources.  China may thus easily absorb Mongolia’s economy, which affects every aspect 
of the security of Mongolia. Unfortunately, the history of Mongolia demonstrates episodes of difficult bilateral relations with both 
Moscow and Beijing. Therefore, this thesis argues that Mongolia must implement and maintain multilateral foreign and security 
policy with respect to both big neighbors, while effectively seeking a “third neighbor” to balance against China and Russia. 
Because, it is very difficult to assure Mongolia’s security using military force, Mongolia must rely on diplomatic and political 
measures. In addition, Mongolia’s military must also remain an effective tool supporting broader national security objectives.  
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
125 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Mongolian security, Chinese Communist Party, the People’s Liberation Army, modernization, 
implication, multilateral policy, third neighbors, bilateral relations, balancing. 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Lieutenant Colonel, Mongolian Army 
B.M.S., Military Academy of Mongolia, 1997 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 


























Harold Trinkunas, PhD 
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
China is transforming the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into an effective fighting 
force with power projection capability. The main objective has been to fill the gap 
between the PLA and leading military forces. China’s military forces modernization 
coincides with its rapid economic growth and growing energy and resource needs. For 
these reasons, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders put forward new missions of 
the PLA, which may include securing China’s interests abroad. This process certainly 
impacts indirectly, if not directly, Mongolia’s security. Like other countries, Mongolia 
does not choose its neighbors. Hence, the geopolitical reality of living between its large 
neighbors, China and Russia, thus defines its fundamental security interests. Though 
Beijing is not likely to use force against Mongolia, and China and Mongolia currently 
enjoy friendly relations, it is uncertain how long this will last. Despite having no 
immediate external threat, China has continued modernizing its military with great 
ambiguity. Therefore, not only Mongolia, but also Western countries, including the 
United States, are wondering why China is pursuing these ambitious military 
modernization effort.   
Mongolia’s underdeveloped economy, small population, absence of financial and 
technological capabilities, and rich natural resources certainly attract both big neighbors’ 
attention. In particular, China has a particular interest, since its economic development 
requires lots of energy and resources.  China may thus easily absorb Mongolia’s 
economy, which affects every aspect of the security of Mongolia. Unfortunately, the 
history of Mongolia demonstrates episodes of difficult bilateral relations with both 
Moscow and Beijing. Therefore, this thesis argues that Mongolia must implement and 
maintain multilateral foreign and security policy with respect to both big neighbors, while 
effectively seeking a “third neighbor” to balance against China and Russia. Because, it is 
very difficult to assure Mongolia’s security using military force, Mongolia must rely on 
diplomatic and political measures. In addition, Mongolia’s military must also remain an 
effective tool supporting broader national security objectives.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE MAJOR ISSUE 
Landlocked and sandwiched between two giant nuclear powers, Mongolia must 
closely and carefully observe decisions, made in Moscow and Beijing, that influence 
Mongolia’s security. The relatively stronger size in demography, economy, and military 
power of its two neighbors inevitably raises concerns in Mongolia regarding its foreign 
policy relationships. In particular, China’s unprecedented economic growth and military 
modernization, and its gradual ascent as a regional power and an increasingly influential 
actor in the global arena, deeply concern Mongolia’s national leaders.  
Mongolia has benefited greatly from China’s rapid economic growth by using the 
Chinese market to introduce its products into the international market. China’s military 
rise, however, has negative implications for Mongolian security. In particular, the 
interests of Mongolia and China conflict in certain area, which certainly brings pressure 
and potential coercion from Beijing on Ulaanbaatar’s decision making.  The consequence 
of these concerns has been Mongolia’s attempt to pursue an independent foreign policy 
that is neutral with respect to both big neighbors and balances against their power with 
powerful countries. This definitely goes against China’s preference. Although China is 
unlikely to use force against Mongolia and Beijing’s reputation would deteriorate if it did 
so, it certainly wants to create conditions favorable to China, and not others. Besides, 
continuity of China’s friendly relations toward Mongolia is not guaranteed as Mongolia 
further develops its democratic principles. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
China has been pursuing a major military modernization campaign, because it 
recognizes how far its military lags behind the leading military powers of the world 
through observing the rapid and decisive military campaigns of the U.S. forces during the 
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first Gulf War, NATO operations in Kosovo, and operations in Afghanistan.1 As China 
implements its military modernization, it directly challenges the principles of the 
Mongolian foreign policy in regards to multi-polarity, neutrality, and non-involvement. 
In addition, the richness of natural resources in Mongolia generates concern because of 
the rapidly growing Chinese energy requirements and China’s growing efforts in seeking 
cheap energy and other resources everywhere in the world. As a result, China sees the 
need to protect its expanding interests and resource supply lines.2 Undoubtedly, the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) serves the interests of China, which may expand as time 
goes by.  Mongolia’s active search for a third ally ultimately contradicts how China 
perceives these countries, specifically the United States, Japan, and Germany.  
Mongolia’s Foreign Policy Concept focuses on certain dimensions while 
upholding peace and pursuing a multi-base policy. The first dimension is maintaining 
friendly relations with Mongolia’s two immediate neighbors, China and Russia, while 
pursuing a non-involvement policy. The second dimension is developing friendly 
relations with a third neighbor. The third dimension is strengthening Mongolia’s position 
in Asia and securing constructive participation in the region. The fourth dimension is 
promoting cooperation with the UN and other international organizations.3  The reason to 
focus on the UN and other organizations is to emphasize Mongolia’s attempts to survive 
in its difficult context.  However, as China’s military rises and modernizes, and as it takes 
on new missions to address near and long-term political and economic requirements, new 
tasks have emerged. All these new tasks could run counter to Mongolia’s attempts to 
provide security and raise its reputation in the international community by means of 
active involvement in international and regional organizations and, recently, its 
involvement in peacekeeping operations. Dominated by the single communist party and 
as an instrument of that party in China, the PLA undertakes dual missions, targeting both 
                                                 
1 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2002), 3–8. 
2 David Lai and Marc Miller, Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other than Taiwan, ed. Roy 
Kamphausen, David Lai and Andrew Scobell (Strategic Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army War College, 
2009), 10. 
3 For more details, visit the official Web site of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia, 
http://www.mfat.gov.mn/  (accessed 14 February 2010). 
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internal and external enemies.4 Therefore, for the purpose of regaining lost territory, 
Chinese leaders may easily use force against Mongolia as they did against their own 
citizens in 1989.  
It is inevitable that the Asia-Pacific region will experience the rise of China’s 
military. Particularly, Mongolia, which is seriously outnumbered, has deep concerns 
about lagging far behind Chinese military technology. Most Mongolian weapon systems 
were produced and exported from the Soviet Union in the 60s and 70s. There has been no 
significant military upgrading since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In contrast, despite 
the favorable security environment and without a pressing external threat, China’s 
defense expenditure has been rising sharply since 1988. China’s official military 
spending rose from 21.8B RMB in 1988 to 141B Yuan in 20015 and it has skyrocketed in 
recent years. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
In order to analyze how the rise of China’s military may affect Mongolian 
security, this thesis concentrates on Mongolia’s relations with its two neighbors (with 
emphasis on China), its search of balancing partners, and Mongolia’s active involvement 
in regional organizations, initiatives and activities (with emphasis on Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization). Unfortunately, Mongolia’s dependence on China for 
commodities and on Russia for petroleum products constrains its efforts to avoid a deep 
dependency on either of its two neighbors. This dependence also affects Mongolia’s 
attempts to avoid confrontations and develop relations with other countries. It even 
affects visits of the Dalai Lama to Mongolia, which have a purely religious purpose, but 
which China tries to influence or contravene. In order to limit Chinese influence, 
Mongolia emphasizes relations with third neighbors and international organizations to 
receive assistance on economic, political, and social development.  This is the main 
reason Mongolia has had a preference for extracting and processing its strategic resources 
(such as copper, gold, coal, and lately uranium) with third-party countries or at least a 
                                                 
4 Lai and Miller, Beyond the Strait, 12. 
5 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 193. 
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preference for having equal participation of Moscow and Beijing. Mongolia is rich in 
natural resources. Therefore, even while its uranium reserves are currently gaining 
greater attention, Mongolian decision makers are carefully diversifying investment 
partners in its nuclear industry and copper mining sectors to avoid over reliance on any 
single party.6 
The second element of Mongolia’s efforts is to expand relations with Western and 
Asian developed countries such as the United States, Japan and European Union 
countries, while pursuing friendly but not excessively close ties with its immediate 
neighbors.  Former President Enkhbayar said that Mongolia’s multi-polar foreign policy 
is the outcome of his country’s concern not to be isolated.7 However, the PLA has 
developed dramatically in recent years.  Besides the traditional duties of upholding 
national security and internal unity, the PLA has new tasks: 
Providing an important source of strength for consolidating the ruling 
position of the CCP, providing a solid security guarantee for sustaining the 
important period of strategic opportunity for national development, 
providing a strong strategic support for safeguarding national interests, 
and playing and promoting common development.8  
Chinese leaders and PLA strategists have a common assessment about the U.S. 
presence and influence in Asia-Pacific affairs. They view the United States as the greatest 
threat to international peace, as well as to China’s own national security and foreign 
policy goals.9 Therefore, Mongolia’s aspiration to expand its relations with the 
aforementioned countries—particularly the United States—contradicts the Chinese 
sentiment toward U.S. hegemony. So how should Mongolia address this?  
Even though Chinese leaders continue to claim that they will not use force due to 
China’s traditional peace-loving nature, Beijing’s criticism of the hegemonic approach of 
the United States in international politics and the proven historical examples of its 
                                                 
6 Ram Sachs and Undraa Agvaanluvsan, “Feeling the Future: Mongolian Uranium and Nuclear Power 
Plant Growth in China and India” (Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, 2009), 1. 
7 Li Narangoa, “Mongolia and Preventive Diplomacy, Haunted by History and Becoming 
Cosmopolitan,” Asian Survey 49, no. 2  (Berkeley, CA) (2009), 372. 
8 Lai and Miller, Beyond the Strait, 10. 
9 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 288–289. 
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readiness to use of force to advance its national interest make it hard to believe that China 
is inherently peaceful. Furthermore, it is difficult to predict a different Chinese approach 
to international affairs and to believe that China will not use force to carry out its new 
missions. As China’s power continues to grow and as its military modernization 
proceeds, the world may anticipate that it will not hesitate to show its will to protect its 
national interest at home and abroad with military power.10 In 2005, U.S. Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated, “China appears to be expanding its missile force and 
also improving its ability to project power, and developing advanced systems of military 
technology. Since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: Why this growing 
investment? Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases? Why does China 
have these continuing robust deployments?”11 
Although China has demobilized some of its military personnel since the mid 
1980s, ground forces are speeding up their “mechanization” process. The main reason for 
the large-scale demobilization was the decline of the potential Soviet threat. However, the 
change in military strength is also an indication of the regime’s desire to create a real 
internal paramilitary force and to downsize the PLA’s gigantic forces in order to alter the 
PLA into a more effective fighting force.12 This assumption, along with the remaining 
ground force stationed north of the capital,13 certainly evokes concerns for Mongolia’s 
security and its military transformation. 
Another principle that Ulaanbaatar applies to its security is joining international 
and regional organizations and treaties that Beijing joins, and accepting responsibility for 
and adhering to principles that benefit Mongolia. The best example is the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization. The main purpose of participating in this Chinese-Russian-led 
security organization is its emphasis on the principles of “sovereignty,” “territorial 
integrity,” and “no unilateral military superiority in adjacent areas.” These are principles 
                                                 
10 Lai and Miller, Beyond the Strait,  21–22. 
11 Richard Fisher, China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (West 
Point: Praeger Security International, 2008), 10. 
12 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 149–150. 
13 Ibid., 150. 
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that Mongolia strongly wants from its neighbors.14  Still, Beijing wants to show its 
dominance by pushing Mongolia to become a member of the organization to limit its 
independent policy within Beijing spheres of influence, while Mongolia is satisfied with 
its observer status.  Indeed, both China and Russia oppose anyone consolidating influence 
in Mongolia.  
Moreover, the Great Hural (parliament) of Mongolia has adopted a special law 
and resolution that declare its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone.15 However, this 
approach may contradict China’s aspirations to increase the reliance on atomic energy by 
claiming development for peaceful purposes with by-products that could be used in 
nuclear weapons. Conventional estimates place Mongolia’s uranium reserves at 62,000 
tons, but untested reserves may raise the estimate to 1.39 million tons, constituting the 
largest reserves in the world.16 
It is difficult to apply any single international relations theory to Mongolia’s 
security dilemma in a context of Chinese military modernization and economic 
development. The main schools of international relations theory do not adequately 
address this situation. In particular, both realism, which is based on the balance of threat 
or the balance of power, and alliance theories seem quite applicable for explaining 
Mongolia-China relationship. However, Mongolia’s location between two daunting 
neighbors provokes a multi lateral foreign policy preference and it is not adequately 
addressed by the main claims of the above-mentioned theories. Additionally, Mongolia 
seeks a strong third partner to balance its neighbors’ dominance.  
Therefore, the main hypothesis of this thesis is to assess an applicable 
international relations theory for Mongolian security in relation to the inevitable rise of 
China and its military. The thesis also explains and links the theory to the current 
Mongolian preferences and priorities on national security. To do this, this thesis 
scrutinizes China’s military modernization process since the end of the Cold War. The 
                                                 
14 Li Narangoa, “Mongolia and Preventive Diplomacy, Haunted by History and Becoming 
Cosmopolitan,” Asian Survey (Berkeley, CA) 49, no. 2 (2009), 364–367. 
15 Jargalsaikhany Enkhsaikhan, “Mongolia’s Status: The Case for a Unique Approach,” Asian Affairs 
(Heldref Publications) 27, no. 4 (Winter 2001), 224–226.  
16 Ram Sachs and Undraa Agvaanluvsan, “Feeling the Future: Mongolian Uranium and Nuclear 
Power Plant Growth in China and India” (Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, 2009), 1. 
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thesis thus studies China’s military modernization as an independent variable and its 
cause and effect on Mongolia’s security as a dependent variable. The study may 
contribute a detailed analysis of contemporary China’s military rise. Additionally, this 
thesis offers suggestions on state and military courses of actions for Mongolia’s attempt 
to provide security.  
The major findings in the Mongolia’s security related literature show that it is 
very difficult or almost impossible to provide security in Mongolia using the military.  
The best way to provide security, highlighted in the National Security Concept, uses 
diplomacy and political measurements such as maintaining neutrality, seeking third 
partners, and engaging regional and international initiatives. In other words, Mongolia 
must actively contribute in global peace and stability to be recognized by more countries. 
However, military aspects should not be ignored.  There should be focus on developing 
military members’ (citizens as well) educational, scientific, intellectual, and information 
potentials is necessary.  In other words, it emphasizes high technology training, 
specifically information and electronic assets, and develops the ability to conduct 
information (IW) and electronic warfare (EW).  To engage a rational defense policy, 
Mongolia must improve and develop its “territorial defense” policy with an integrated 
defense system of close cooperation involving the armed forces personnel and the 
citizens.  Providing support in the multinational operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
contributing troops in various peacekeeping and peace support operations are the 
appropriate examples of using its military to support Mongolian government’s diplomatic 
policy to improve its stature in the regional and international arenas. 
D.  METHODS AND SOURCES 
This research attempts to determine how the rise and modernization of China’s 
military could affect Mongolia’s security and its military transformation. As mentioned 
earlier, this thesis examines the main hypothesis of testing an applicable international 
relations theory for Mongolian security under the inevitable rise of China and its military, 
and attempts to explain and link this theory to the current Mongolian preferences and 
priorities on national security.  Moreover, the thesis scrutinizes China’s military 
 8
modernization process in detail.  In order to assess this hypothesis, this thesis studies 
China’s military modernization as an independent variable and its cause and effect on 
Mongolia’s security as a dependent variable.  Since the modernization process of China’s 
military sped up after the end of the Cold War, the research focuses on the post-Cold War 
era.   
As the thesis examines and applies international relations theories to the 
Mongolian case, it attempts to find the best-suited theory. The study tests theories on 
Mongolian relations with the immediate neighbors, third partners, and international 
parties. While applying theories, the thesis provides detailed research on China’s military 
that could change the applicability of these theories. Moreover, the study measures China 
and Mongolia’s economic transformations; their roles in, and commitments to military 
modernization; and both countries’ media commentary, official government publications, 
and statements by political elites. 
It is difficult to measure how the rise of China’s military would affect Mongolia’s 
security because it is clear that Mongolia is much smaller than China despite Mongolia’s 
vast territory in the Asian plateau. It is also difficult to compare Chinese population or 
economic performance to small nations such as Mongolia. It is better to measure the 
development of soft power or human resource development. Ravdan Bold, thus 
summarizes that “the strength of a small nation is measured not by the wealth its land 
possesses but by its educational, scientific, cultural, intellectual, and informational 
potentials.  In other words, today security is defined not by a country’s self-defense 
capacity but by its capacity to survive and compete.”17  
It is, as well, a difficult task to acquire detailed information about China’s military 
forces.  The information in this thesis about the changes and transformation of China’s 
military are based on secondary sources, such as newspapers, magazines, governmental 
statements, and Chinese and foreign analysts’ comments and predictions.  Another set of 
sources that are used to focus on the implications of Chinese military development are 
Mongolian Foreign policy and Security concepts, bilateral agreements and cooperation, 
                                                 
17 Ravdan Bold, The Security of Small State: Option for Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar: The Institute of 
Strategic Studies press, 2000), 36. 
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Mongolia’s state and military administrations’ official view, professional magazines and 
newspapers, government and analysts’ thoughts, interviews, and writings. Moreover, 
Chinese newspapers, government officials’ speeches, professional magazines, and 
government and military officials’ judgments are valuable sources although accuracy is 
questionable. 
E. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter briefly explains the research 
questions and methodology, applicable theories, and research tools and aspects. The 
second chapter is entirely devoted for the Chinese military modernization. Chapter III 
assesses the implications of the Chinese military modernization for Mongolian security. 
Chapter IV discusses possible options, choices, and likely courses of action to maintain 
security in Mongolia. The last chapter concludes with the findings of the thesis as 
Mongolia attempts to provide security while being under the eminent and looming threat 
of Chinese military forces and economic domination. 
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II. CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
The Chinese military started its modernization process in 1985. At a Central 
Military Committee meeting, Deng expressed his opinion that China no longer faced was 
“early, major, and nuclear war,” as seen by Mao, but rather “local, limited war.”18 Since 
the 1980s, China has been pursuing ambiguous objectives in transforming and 
modernizing its military doctrine, weapons and equipment, and it has become a major 
issue for China experts to determine these goals. This chapter provides some assessment 
on doctrinal and other transformations of all services in the PLA, and attempts to reveal 
the roots of this rapid modernization.  
David Blasko argues in his book: 
Because the threat of major war was low, a “bloated” PLA could take its 
time to reform, focusing first on downsizing its four million-plus force. 
But also, because a major threat was not imminent, it was not necessary 
for the Chinese government to sink vast sums of money and natural 
resources to modernize the PLA rapidly. In its early years PLA 
modernization, therefore, focused primarily on relatively inexpensive 
reforms such as personnel reductions, force restructuring, and doctrinal 
updates.19  
Though Chinese military expenditure has grown steadily, it has been a difficult 
task to modernize a totally outdated military force after the proclamation of the People’s 
Republic; in other words, China started from zero.  Recently, however, the PLA has 
enjoyed large budget increases and accomplished the tremendous advances in renewing 
its military equipment, updating its weapons systems (acquisition), and improving 
doctrines to launch effective and rapid operations in any corner of its vast territory. The 
PLA ground force has started to strengthen its rapid reaction units with airborne assets. 
The reduction of the troops also enables the ground forces to save certain expenditures 
and to increase its ability to build quick reaction forces. The PLA Navy purchased 
newer—though not the latest, surface combat ships and submarines with longer 
                                                 
18 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st century 
(Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group Press, 2006), 11. 
19 Ibid., 5. 
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operational ranges—while it apparently pushes hard to attain carrier capability. The PLA 
Air Force has been assiduously working on the project of introducing a Chinese-made, 
state-of-the-art fighter, while it continues acquiring the latest aircraft from Russia, and 
works to improve its aerial refueling capability and operational range. 
A. ROOTS OF THE MODERNIZATION 
States have a special interest in their citizens’ well being. In order to ensure their 
citizens well being, states provide services. One of the important services is the security 
of the state. In order to provide security and stability, states define political and economic 
objectives and policy, which are shaped and influenced by various external and domestic 
aspects. After Mao’s death, his legacy has continued affecting the modernization and 
transformation of the Chinese military. However, his own idea of waging the “People’s 
War,” using China’s large population and vast territory to overcome the enemy’s 
technological superiority,20 started to fade. By the end of the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping 
announced that the possibility of the major war or total war was no longer imminent; 
therefore, Chinese military needed to start a long-term military modernization.21 In 
addition to this announcement, Deng and Chinese military leaders discussed the change 
of the “people’s war” doctrine to “people’s war under modern conditions.” When China’s 
relationship started to normalize with the United States in the beginning of 1970s, Deng 
introduced the idea of “local and limited war.” His main claim of changing from the 
“people’s war” concept to a “local and limited war” was the normalization of relations 
with the United States, and China was no longer facing the threat of an imminent and 
total war. Later, his idea was supported by the rapprochement of the Soviet Union and 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). The root of today’s modernization thus had evolved 
throughout the history of the PRC, and the first Gulf War dramatically changed the 
military doctrine and ignited the long-term modernization of the PLA. 
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1. Foreign Influence 
Since the creation of the PRC, relationships with the Soviet Union, and later with 
the United States, deeply affected Chinese military development and strategy as well as 
domestic politics. Having a good relationship with one of these superpowers, and 
standing hostile to another, has been the best achievement in Chinese military history in 
terms of providing security.   
In the beginning years of the PRC, the Chinese military enjoyed extensive 
military assistance from the Soviet Union; eventually the two countries’ relationship 
deteriorated and split. When Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, they faced the 
urgent task of converting their victorious but primitive army into an armed force capable 
of defending China from external enemies. It was a superb guerilla force, but lacked 
many aspects of the modern professional military, such as modern naval and air arms, 
centralized command structure, sophisticated communications and logistics systems, and, 
most importantly, professional officers and non-commissioned officers. The Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) leaders, including Mao, agreed at once to overcome these 
deficiencies without delay.22 They turned to the Soviet Union because both were 
Communist states. The Sino-Soviet treaty was signed in 1950, but the other superpower, 
the United States, did not recognize the Chinese Communist government. The military 
assistance that was begun during the Korean War was accelerated and expanded after the 
ceasefire, reaching an estimated cost of U.S.$2 billion by 1957. This assistance program 
was essential for the military transformation of the PLA that China could not acquire 
from any other sources. Throughout this period, many Chinese officers studied in Soviet 
military academies, a number of Soviet advisors arrived in China, and reorganization and 
professionalization according to the Soviet model were taking place.23 Domestically, 
during the initial period of the PRC, Mao and other leaders of the Communist Party had a 
harmonious relationship during the swift change in the PLA.   
In the end of the 1950s, however, Beijing and Moscow’s relationship had started 
to deteriorate, which led to the cut-off not only of military supplies and assistance but 
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23 Ibid., 6. 
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also of economic aid. Furthermore, the two countries’ relationship was split for various 
reasons, and the antagonizing period had arrived. During this period, both Beijing and 
Moscow referred to each other as the greatest potential enemies and started the build-up 
of their militaries in the peripheral areas; the danger of nuclear attack was imminent. 
China thus emphasized its own ability with the ambitious perspective and strategy of 
Mao. Self-sustainment was considered the only way to survive. The harsh condition, of 
having both superpowers of that era against China, had hindered the military 
transformation. Immature economic development and the loss of its immediate patron 
further exacerbated China’s situation. Chinese military modernization was hampered, so 
it placed much greater effort into building the nuclear capability to prevent a Soviet 
Union attack on the mainland. In the meantime, Beijing confronted Washington’s 
hostility over the Taiwan Strait issue. 
During the early 1970s, Beijing’s attitude shifted, and the United States changed 
its rigid stance toward China. It was a huge relief for the Communist leaders in China, 
and they did not want to lose a chance of neutralizing one superpower’s hostility. While 
China and the United States begun their collaboration—deepening their relations as well 
as decreasing the tension—the Sino-Soviet confrontation still existed, though the 
imminent threat of the escalation of war seemed unlikely. Consequently, at the end of the 
1970s, China reconsidered its security perspective, after the death of Mao, and shifted 
from the preparation for the total war against the Soviet Union to the local war in Chinese 
periphery.   
When Leonid Brejnev died and the new generation of Soviet leaders emerged in 
the beginning of the 1980s, the Sino-Soviet relationship began to improve. For this 
reason, the possibility of the border war between China and the Soviet Union was greatly 
diminished. Along with “perestroika” in the Soviet Union and the decline of the 
communist regime, Beijing and Moscow resumed bilateral talks and the Soviet Union 
military assistance and arms sales regained and further increased. After the Tiananmen 
crises, many Western countries including the United States blamed Beijing; they stopped 
their partnership with China and embargoed military assistance. The Soviet Union—later 
its successor, Russia—only kept the relationship with China out of the major powers. 
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After the 1990s, Russia became the sole provider of the modern military technology to 
the PLA. Since the collapse of the communist system, Russia became a main source of 
the Chinese military modernization. Even today, China has continued to purchase the 
latest models of arms and military equipment from Russia.  
The first Gulf War, however, totally changed the PLA experts and scientists’ 
speculation of modern warfare. The coalition operation led by the United States 
demonstrated that information technology had become inseparable from the modern war. 
The PLA commanders and the CCP leaders were shocked by the intensity and the speed 
of the operation. The shock worsened during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) intervention in Kosovo, which had a profound effect on national leaders. As a 
result, Chinese leaders acknowledged the lag between the PLA and the leading militaries 
in the world, and the need for intense progress in its military modernization program.24 
China began putting great effort and resources into modernizing its military and 
implementing huge projects to catch up with the leading military powers. The PLA 
transformation, however, is being implemented with far fewer financial resources than 
the U.S. Army transformation of 70s and 80s.25 
2. Domestic Influence 
When Communists defeated Nationalist forces and expelled the Republic of 
China (ROC) authorities to Formosa Island, the CCP confronted a serious legitimacy 
issue. The new Communist state was recognized by only a few socialist states and there 
was a sovereignty dilemma. No Western powers, including the United States, recognized 
the newly established state, and the ROC government still represented China in the UN. 
Therefore, China had only one choice to lean toward the Soviet Union in order to provide 
breathing space and time to build the national economic structure and strong military 
forces. In other words, the PRC’s foreign relationships greatly influenced its domestic 
affairs and national leaders.   
                                                 
24 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 3–7. 
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Specifically, Mao had relentlessly pursued the harsh domestic policy shaped by 
his ideological belief of building a socialist society. According to Mao’s view, a “class 
struggle,” to eliminate bourgeois classes, was the main instrument to build the socialist 
society, and the main method was the constant revolution using the mass population of 
China. For this reason, he constantly urged and emphasized the superiority of the “human 
element” in military doctrine. However, the PLA took successful initial steps toward 
professionalism, such as creating professional officer corps; establishing military schools 
and academies; setting up for military routine service and military ranks; and forming the 
Soviet style military structure, formation, and discipline. Unfortunately, these measures 
were the apparent departure from Maoist military principles and practices. Ellis Joffe 
cites, “The Maoist model had several unique features designed to cultivate the ‘human 
element.’ It emphasized voluntaristic motivation and conscious discipline. It encouraged 
comrade relations, informality, and egalitarianism between the ranks, based on long years 
of close and intimate association.”26 
As a result, Mao’s unilateral approach, regardless of professional military advice, 
truly impeded military modernization while he was in charge. All the leaders who were 
against his approach were purged or moved away from their positions. The first victim 
was Marshal Peng Duhai. Peng was a profound supporter of the professionalization of the 
PLA and he was Defense Minister when he was purged. This is one the incidents that 
Mao was doing to clear his path building a socialist society according to his ideological 
belief. Consequently, party leaders gave precedence to political and ideological factors on 
which the superiority of the “human element” depends. The professional military argued 
instead that the success of an army in a modern war depends first and foremost on its 
material resources and professional competence.27 
The deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship toward the end of the 1950s 
further exacerbated China’s domestic situation. Stalin’s death in 1953, the power struggle 
within his successors, and Mao’s belief that the new Soviet leaders should acknowledge 
him as a central figure in the socialist system were the main causes of the two countries’ 
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split. Khrushchev’s new policy of the “peaceful coexistence” definitely opposed what 
Mao had speculated. China was profoundly affected by the Russian launching of an 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and the orbiting of Earth satellites. Mao 
expressed his famous metaphor, “The East wind prevails over the West wind.” In reality, 
Russians did not want to attack using their achievements, but to reach an agreement with 
the United States. This course was unacceptable to the Chinese that they could be left 
without any fulfillment of their objectives.28 Certainly due to these discontents, Mao 
launched artillery bombardment of the offshore island in the Taiwan Strait to test whether 
the Soviets and the Americans would keep their promises to China and Taiwan.   
Mao’s adamant belief in constant revolution in order to maintain his agenda and 
power, and his blame of everyone who had been inconsistent with it, truly impacted 
domestic development and the PLA modernization. In fact, the PLA modernization 
halted, its professional tendency stepped back, ranks were abolished, and political 
education in the all levels of the PLA had resumed. The bitter outcomes that Chinese 
people experienced during this period were the erroneous policy decisions to launch the 
Great Leap Forward (GLF) movement and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
(GPCR). The CCP leaders’ consensus was the main domestic leverage of the defense 
modernization in China, but it was truly eradicated by Mao, as China was antagonizing 
by both superpowers. 
Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, had a difficult time reviving the domestic 
economy as well as the deeply politicized PLA. The prolonged involvement in politics 
during the GPCR put the PLA in a very important position, its leaders obtained a 
powerful voice in policy-making councils, and its officers and personnel assumed wide-
ranging political and administrative responsibilities throughout the country. As a result, 
the PLA lost most of the military concerns and became largely autonomous from civilian 
control. Therefore, Deng’s first and foremost task on the PLA was to remove it from 
politics and reassert political control over it. 29 
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B. EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE 
Chinese military doctrine has changed significantly since the foundation of the 
People’s Republic, due to shifting foreign circumstances and the leadership transition. 
David Shambaugh noticed that doctrine is essential to Chinese military modernization; 
and it has been not only the abstract study of warfare, but also a vital aspect of how the 
PLA is organized and prepares to apply lethal force.30 Richard Fisher emphasizes 
studying the importance of the PLA doctrine, stating,  
The study of a country’s military doctrine is crucial as it can go far to 
explain its strategic stance and the type of operations a country deems 
necessary, and thus the force structure it may seek. This can be combined 
with assessments of actual military activities and equipment 
modernization to derive a more complete assessment.  
China’s primary operational strategy guideline is called “Active Defense,” which 
stipulates that “China does not initiate wars or fight wars of aggression.” 31 
1. People’s War 
For many years, the PLA’s main military strategy has been known as “active 
defense.” The term originated during the Chinese revolutionary war, when Mao proposed 
a military strategy of “offensive defense” or “defense through decisive engagements,” 32 
in which PLA units would actively engage the enemy, exploiting its weak points and 
attempting to destroy enemy capabilities and will.33 Active defense is an important aspect 
of the “people’s war” concept. Shambaugh highlights, “The Maoist theory of the people’s 
war is often regarded as passive warfare of necessity to “lure the enemy in deep” in order 
to overcome the enemy’s technological superiority by playing to the strengths of 
geography and the civilian population.”34  
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The main element of the “people’s war” concept had been the “human element” 
prior to the material resources and professionalization. Superiority of the human element 
enabled the Chinese Communists to confront far stronger and advanced military forces or 
enemies. This Maoist model had several unique features, such as comradely relations, 
informality and egalitarianism and supreme significance of close cooperation with the 
civilian population, designed to utilize humans rather than material resources. The main 
concept was using highly motivated Chinese soldiers against the technologically and 
materially superior enemy forces. In addition, China’s vast territory and difficult terrain 
and support of the population should provide the PLA space to maneuver even though it 
was significantly inferior to major military powers and did not have access to 
modernization resources.35   
In other words, the people’s war doctrine allowed Chinese leaders, particularly 
Mao, to answer security problems that China was facing after the Soviet Union cut 
military assistance. It was perhaps the only choice for Mao because China was lacking 
the necessary assets to deter or resist foreign aggression during this period. Therefore, he 
took the old doctrine used during the revolutionary war of bringing invaders deep into the 
mainland and fighting a war of attrition instead of protecting its boundaries. The 
industrial centers were sacrificed and the long-lasting guerilla war had become the main 
method to wage war. As China had been facing both superpowers during this period, self-
reliance became a major resource and engine to develop the Chinese economy and resist 
the imminent Soviet threat, though some leaders had different opinions. 
2. People’s War Under Modern Conditions 
Mao Zedong was an adamant and influential leader who halted the transformation 
and modernization of the PLA. Immediately after his death, Deng consolidated his power 
and started the transformation of the PLA. China’s relationship with the United States 
gradually improved, and China was no longer facing dual superpower adversaries, though 
the potential Soviet threat remained. The advantage during the close relations with 
Western powers was the exposure to foreign technology after years of separation from 
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the superpowers. In other words, China had access to Western technology, from the 
United States in particular, that could facilitate modernizing the PLA. After the Soviets 
cut their military assistance at the end of the 1950s, China pursued a “self-reliance” 
policy and experienced the hardest time and chaos in its Communist history. 
There were serious questions about the viability of the “people’s war” doctrine. 
Steady improvements in military technology, which brought unprecedented accuracy, 
range, and destructiveness of the Soviet weaponry, raised a continuity question on the 
Maoist doctrine. These improvements gave the Soviets an enormous capability to strike 
decisively with astronomical damage in the initial stage and infiltrate quickly into the 
deep mainland. In addition, modern weaponry—nuclear weaponry in particular—had a 
destructive effect that could disable the major economic, military, and political centers in 
the North-east.36 Many dignitaries became concerned about this issue, and the new term 
of doctrine was generated: “people’s war under modern conditions.” Then-Defense 
Minister Xu Xiangqian notes: 
War is now conducted in a way different from that in the past. …  The 
target of attack, the scale of war, and even the method of fighting are new 
to us. … Our military thinking must tally with the changing conditions.  If 
we treat and command a modern war in the way we commanded a war 
during the 1930s and 1940s, we are bound to meet with a big rebuff and 
suffer a serious defeat.37 
Deng observed in his speech that the main idea— “lure the enemy in deep”—was 
no longer appropriate to the “people’s war under modern conditions.” His main idea on 
terminology was changing, from “lure the enemy in deep” to “active defense,” and he 
suggested this defense should not be fought in the depths of the mainland. Instead, he 
advised a “frontier defense” terminology38 since China’s main industrial and economic 
centers, which were a first priority in Deng’s “four modernization,” were all located in 
the eastern coastal areas. Furthermore, he highlighted the emphasis on weaponry instead 
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of the human factor in war, which suggested the military modernization.  This tenet, 
however, went exactly against the Maoist human wave thought.   
Nan Li points out several differences in strategic aspects of the “people’s war” 
and the “people’s war under modern conditions.” First, instead fighting in the deep 
interior of China during the “people’s war,” the PLA should attempt to defeat the enemy 
close to the border under the latter one. Second, under the people’s war, China would not 
place emphasis on the initial phase of war, but under the “people’s war under modern 
conditions,” early battles became more significant in influencing the course of war. 
Third, under the latter, positional warfare was stressed. Fourth, the latter one suggests 
that cities were considered vital centers to be defended, which was a significant departure 
from the Maoist thought of abandoning cities and using vast rural areas where enemies 
could be scattered and defeated piece by piece. Finally, the Chinese started to talk—
under the “people’s war under modern conditions”—about retaliating when the enemy 
forces use nuclear weapons because, by the end of the 1980s, China had developed and 
deployed a small but usable strategic nuclear force.39 This was the indication that some 
aspects of the people’s war doctrine remained, even after China changed its doctrine. 
Then-Chinese forces still were unlikely to be able to stop the far better-equipped Soviet 
army at the border.  Thus, a successful accomplishment of the new doctrine still required 
a prolonged war of attrition.40 
3. Local and Limited War 
During the early 1980s, the Soviets went through a series of leadership changes 
and finally Gorbachev became the new leader of the Soviet Union. Due to Gorbachev’s 
new policy, the Sino-Soviet relationship started to improve. In 1985, PLA war doctrine 
and strategic principles had changed significantly to include a type of war that the PLA 
should be prepared to fight. The PLA doctrine shifted the emphasis from foreign to local. 
Burles and Shulsky state, “In late spring 1985, China’s Central Military Committee 
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(CMC) instructed the PLA that it was no longer necessary to prepare for “early war, 
major war, and nuclear war” with the Soviet Union. Instead, the CMC declared that PLA 
strategy should focus on preparing to fight and win a “local” or “limited” war (jubu 
zhanzheng).”41 At one meeting, Deng Xiaoping told the PLA generals that future 
conflicts were likely localized yet intense. He continued, “The danger of a global war 
may continue to exist. But it is possible that large-scale, global war will not take place in 
the coming long period of time.”42 Chinese military leaders and intellectuals began to 
express that local and limited war would replace total war as the common form of 
contemporary world.43   
David Shambaugh states: 
Chinese defense analysts characterized local or limited wars as conflicts 
that were geographically localized, did not spread to regional or global 
proportions, and usually involved only two combatants. They were often 
fought for ethnic, religious, or political reasons. They were generally short 
and the combatants generally deployed massive ground forces and various 
land weapons. Conventional weapons were prominently used and the use 
of air power was minimal. Some were fought over natural resources, many 
involved boundary disputes. Some were fought by client states of major 
powers, and some were fought to ensure local or regional “hegemony” or 
spheres of influence.44 
There was a central question: Why was local and limited war more likely to occur 
as the danger of a global war continued into the middle of the 1980s? The Soviet Union 
still stood tall within the Communist regime, and the United States had continued to 
enlarge the military and its presence. Some analysts call this period a “Second Cold 
War.” Although China enjoyed the improving relationship with both the United States 
and the Soviet Union, a bipolar system had existed undeniably. Nan Li mentions several 
reasons local war was more likely to occur than major war. First, total war was too 
destructive while both superpowers could not compromise. They needed a middle-range 
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form of struggle. Second, technologically superior forces needed a testing ground for new 
weapons.  Third, local war was a less costly alternative. Fourth, while superpowers 
avoided direct confrontation, they competed with each other for strategic assets and 
resources through local wars. In addition, scarce natural resources could initiate and 
reactivate territorial disputes. Finally, civil conflicts and territorial and ethnic tensions 
would become stimulating factors to increase the likelihood of local war.45 Li notes that 
local war focused first on political and diplomatic factors, and a final resolution tended to 
be achieved through negotiation and compromise. The intention of local war has not been 
the annihilation of the enemy, instead enhancing diplomatic initiatives, intimidating the 
enemy psychology, and acquiring economic resources.46 
In the strategic perspective of local and limited war, Nan Li introduces the 
concepts of “strategic frontier,” and “strategic deterrence,” and on the warfighting level, 
several new strategic principles “winning victory through elite troops,” “gaining initiative 
by striking first,” and “fight a quick battle to force a quick solution.”47 Such concepts and 
principles embody notions of focusing on specific areas using more professional troops 
with modern equipment, extending frontier defense beyond the traditional peripherals, 
and demonstrating Chinese military power beyond practicing only for war. These 
principles clearly departed from the Maoist people’s war doctrine and strategy, but still 
contained some speculations. The battlefield tactics concentrated on rethinking the 
traditional offense and defense operations and the new concept of “in-depth-strike.”48  
Along with the change of these concepts, the PLA aimed to build military units 
that were capable of waging both offensive and defensive operations simultaneously or 
shifting quickly, because of the development of precision-guided munitions and their 
increasing accuracy and destructiveness. Additionally, the PLA aspired to have units with  
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the capability of destroying important in-depth enemy targets using effective, all in depth 
firepower strikes; quick penetration; and beyond forward-control assault assets, 
equipment, and training.   
Traditional inland-based military objectives and ground forces priorities changed 
during this period and, along with the strategic frontier concept, the PLA Air Force 
(PLAAF) and the PLA Navy (PLAN) roles increased. Chinese military leaders stressed 
the importance of maritime territory and the defense of contiguous islands and coastal 
areas. Chinese strategic frontier concept delineates the territorial parameters of a nation’s 
perceived national security interests—territories to which it could be willing to commit 
military forces in pursuit of goals that it defines to be in its national interests. The 
principal shifts were from continental to maritime and national to regional definitions. 
Therefore, PLAN and PLAAF roles increased dramatically and the priority to modernize 
shifted. Along with this shift, Chinese military leaders had to work on the coordination 
between ground forces and aerial and naval forces; thus, a joint operations concept was 
introduced. In order to modernize its air and naval forces, the PLA needed a 
technological upgrade, which China lacked during this time.  In 1984, the PLA changed 
its large division-sized forces into brigade- and battalion-level units and developed 
mobile and rapidly deployable “fist units” on an experimental basis.49 The PLA required 
a great deal of funding to fulfill these objectives, so it started the force reduction process 
in 1985.  However, the PLA still lacked funding and initiatives to accelerate its 
modernization, despite the more offensive nature of the in-depth concept. 
4. Local and Limited War Under High Technology Conditions 
The Gulf War in 1991 truly opened Chinese military leaders’ eyes to modern 
military technology that could swiftly decide the fate of the war. The U.S.-led coalition 
operations against the world’s fourth largest forces in Iraq demonstrated the significance 
of the modern technology. The more supporting and shocking effect of this opening was 
that Iraqi armed forces deployed Chinese weaponry and equipment that was totally 
annihilated and showed a pathetic performance against the U.S. military. However, the 
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Chinese were not absolutely surprised by the U.S.-led coalition forces’ performance. 
Introducing the local and limited war concept six years prior to the Gulf War prevented 
Chinese forces from feeling completely shocked. With the Sino-Soviet rapprochement 
and the increasing pace of Chinese economic development, the PLA started an 
unprecedented reform and modernization.    However, following the Tiananmen incident, 
Western countries embargoed military technology transfers, which apparently hitched the 
Chinese military modernization program.  
The Gulf War certainly had a jarring effect on the PLA generals and analysts.  
Shambaugh contends: 
Nearly every aspect of the campaign reminded the PLA High Command 
of its deficiencies: electronic warfare; precision-guided munitions; stealth 
technology; precision bombing of military targets with minimized 
collateral damage; the sheer number of sorties flown, with minimal loss of 
attack aircraft and life; campaign coordination through airborne command 
and control systems; the deployment of attack aircraft from half a world 
away using in-flight refueling; the use of satellites in targeting and 
intelligence gathering; space-based early warning and surveillance, the 
airlift and rapid deployment capability and so on.50 
Godwin also states, “Following the Gulf War, China’s military strategists placed 
even greater emphasis on technology, modifying their depiction of future conflict from 
limited war to ‘limited war under high-tech condition.’”51 The broad usage of modern 
military technology manifested the importance of it, and the war experience and analysis 
became the major leverage for hastening the PLA modernization. The shocking effect of 
modern military technology underscored the restraints of the PLA’s ability to fulfill the 
objectives of local and limited war’s requirements due to the lack of these new 
technologies.   
According to Nan Li’s argument, the Gulf War “served to eliminate the lingering 
doubts among Chinese strategic planners on introducing the new local war doctrine, 
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principles and tactics. The Gulf War demonstrated that the resolution of high-tech local 
war tends to be quick and lethal, hence validating the principle of “fighting a quick battle 
to gain a quick solution” and showing the undesirability, even impossibility, of fighting a 
protracted war of attrition under the conditions of modern, limited war.”52 Chinese 
analysts also expressed their concerns over the lessons they learned from the Gulf War 
and urged the importance of facilitating the modernization process to fill the gap between 
the advanced military and the PLA. Major General Wang Zhenxi mentions some lessons 
they learned, such as the importance of electronic warfare as a central ingredient of 
modern warfare and an integrated command and control system, particularly Airborne 
Warning and Control System (AWACS) and satellites, the requirement of improving the 
survivability of Chinese weapons, command and control units, and precision guided 
munitions and upgrading logistics stocks and night-vision equipment, etc.53 Former 
Chinese President Jiang Zeming states:  
The facts of the Gulf War have shown that along with the utilization of 
high technology in the military arena, the enhancement of precision attack 
weapons and unprecedented operational intensity, the characteristics of 
sudden, three-dimensional, mobile, rapid, and in-depth attacks have 
become more prominent, and the use of high-tech superiority has 
obviously taken hold of the strategic initiative to an even greater degree.54 
Consequently, China emphasized modern military technology, especially air force 
and naval equipment and weaponry, because of the nature of local and limited war that 
could be fought in the peripheries. The demise of the Soviet Union and its disintegration 
into fifteen separate states clearly affected the Chinese military doctrine and stimulated 
this process. However, with the Tiananmen crisis, the Western countries, led by the 
United States, started blaming the Chinese government for the serious violation of human  
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rights, and banned arms and military technology sales. This led China to turn to Russia 
for acquisitioning modern military equipment and developing its indigenous military 
industries. Shambaugh highlights: 
The PLA intensively studied and quickly began to assimilate doctrinal 
lessons learned from the Gulf War into reform of the force structure. The 
PLA goal is clearly to develop a multifaceted, technologically modern 
force structure capable of pursuing multiple missions in a regional context. 
The CMC shifted its military modernization priorities ‘from quantitative 
to qualitative and from manpower-intensive to technology-intensive mode 
in army building.’ Under modern conditions, high technology has become 
the basic factor and new area of growth in the combat effectiveness of the 
armed forces.55 
Along with the stress of the air force and naval forces modernization priority, 
joint operations concepts required new emphasis. The PLA sought a more capable, 
formidable and modern air force with extended range and better weapons, while attempts 
to build AWACS and aerial refueling capability. Chinese military leaders realized the 
significance of effective air support during naval battles, because China has a wide-
ranging coastline and maritime boundary. China made a significant effort to improve its 
blue-water capability in order to protect its claimed island chains and water territory 
because the most potential threats or conflicts could occur in the Taiwan Strait and the 
South China Sea. In other words, the PLAAF and PLAN play a major role in the active 
defense in the Chinese periphery.  
The PLA also paid a great amount attention to the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA),which extensively use information technology (IT) and computer systems in the 
battlefield and modern warfare. The considerably well-developed civilian computer 
technology sectors enabled the PLA to develop IT capability and apply it to their 
doctrine, weapon systems and training. Shambaugh adds, “Computers and satellites have 
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warfare.  The information age has revolutionized the physical domain of combat, for the 
first time providing modern militaries with the hope of achieving ‘total battlespace 
awareness.’”56 
5. Conclusion 
According to military writings and analyses, the PLA realized the significance of 
modern technology and the speed of its development. Moreover, Chinese Communist 
leaders learned that the PLA lagged far behind the leading military forces, particularly the 
U.S. military, in the operational tempo, weapons modernization, and a warfighting 
doctrine. Therefore, Chinese leaders and military intellectuals applied significant changes 
to China’s military doctrine, though they still need more resources and time to catch up. 
Since the intensification process of the modernization after the Gulf War, the PLA has 
managed to acquire some modern equipment such as planes, ships and submarines and 
considerably improved the domestic military industrial ability. Hitherto, China possesses 
a far stronger military force than any other state in the region and improving its military’s 
power projection capability. Since the PLA remains a major instrument to ensure the 
CCP legitimacy and the CCP realizes that a strong military is an important pillar of a 
great power, China will continue to build up and modernize the PLA in order to 
accomplish objectives in its new military doctrine. With the modernizing and effective 
military, China poses a potential threat to other nations, particularly a small, neighboring 
country such as Mongolia. The next part of this thesis discusses the PLA services’ 
paradigms, sizes, and modernization processes. 
C. PLA FORCES 
The previous sections in this thesis highlighted the shifting priority of the ground 
forces to naval and air forces due to the changing nature of international stability and 
order and the Chinese military doctrine. The Chinese leaders have emphasized quality 
over quantity in order to maintain the military capability as the PLA steadily has reduced 
its personnel.  However, military modernization in China was based on doctrinal shifts 
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during various periods of time. For instance, the PLA puts a great amount of resource to 
modernize the PLAAF and PLAN, while transforming the PLA ground forces into a more 
mobile, effective, and modern forces and this tendency is based on the local and limited 
war under high tech condition doctrine.  
The vast majority of the PLA ground force equipment is produced by the Chinese 
defence industries. Most of the newer equipment is based on designs of the 1980s and 
1990s, and some of them are the result of China’s own research and development 
activities while others are simply derived from reverse-engineering from foreign sources. 
According to the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
China remained the single largest recipient of foreign military sale from 2004 through 
2008, followed by India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), South Korea and Greece. 
China has been a major recipient of weapons since the early 1990s and has been the 
largest importer for several years. Most Chinese arms imports originate from Russia. 
However, Russian deliveries to China dropped significantly during 2007 and 2008. China 
has used its access to Russian technology to develop indigenous weapons, in some cases 
using illegally copied Russian components. Both countries agreed in 2008 to abide by 
intellectual property laws specifically for military equipment.57 
1. PLA Ground Forces 
a. Mission 
The PLA ground forces remain the largest segment of the Chinese armed 
forces, though it was affected most during the reduction processes for the last three 
decades.  Cortez Cooper defines the mission: “The PLA ground force is tasked to support 
domestic stability operations; defend borders across mountain, jungle, and desert terrain; 
conduct military diplomacy abroad; and prepare for a local war with significant power 
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projection requirements.”58 He continues that though the PLA ground forces have 
“played fourth fiddle” to missile, air, and naval forces in terms of modernization priority, 
it has not been forgotten. The PLA ground forces remain as the primary arbiter of party 
control throughout the country, a key contributor to Beijing’s foreign policy initiatives, 
and a protector of a 22,000-kilometer land boundary adjacent to a number of current and 
potential flash points.59  The overall picture of the Ground forces modernization is deeply 
related to the doctrinal change and focuses on quality over quantity and information 
technology in order to fulfill their missions. 
b. Size 
Even though the PLA launched large reductions in 1985, 1997 and 2003, 
China still possesses the largest armed forces in the world. Blasko states, “in the middle 
of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the PLA ground forces amount to roughly 
1.6 million personnel. They are organized into 18 group armies, along with a number of 
independent units that do not belong to any group army.”60 While the Annual Report to 
Congress on “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008” approximated 
1.25 million ground forces personnel,61 the London-based International Institute of 
Strategic Studies estimated 1.6 million troops in the ground forces of China in the annual 
Military Balance publication.62 As mentioned earlier, while the PLA Ground Forces are 
reducing its personnel, recent and more advanced weaponry, equipment and assets have 
been introduced into the service. 
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c. Capability and Modernization 
Affected the most by the force reduction process within the three major 
services of the PLA, ground forces remain as the main force (70 percent of the total PLA 
strength) in the service who decides the battle, according to Chinese military doctrine. 
The 38th Group Army (GA) in the Beijing military region (MR) and the 39th GA in the 
Shenyang MR are “Rapid Reaction Units (RRU),” who are expected to deploy on notice 
for combat from the garrison without personnel or equipment augmentation.63 As the 
PLA has grown smaller and more mobile, “rapid reaction” or rapid mobilization is a 
basic task practiced by all units in the active military and reserves, and now each MR has 
a Special Operations Force (SOF) unit.64 Additionally, the Air Force’s 15th Airborne 
Corps has selected one of the leading RRUs in the Chinese military. Therefore, airborne 
forces are becoming very important. Ground forces are intensely developing amphibious 
operations capabilities, especially in coastal military regions. The 1st GA’s 1st 
Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division (MID) in Nanjing MR was the first army 
division transformed into an amphibious unit. An amphibious armored brigade is also 
found in the region. The PLA’s second amphibious mechanized division, the 124th, is in 
Guangzhou MR. The Ground Forces’ two amphibious divisions are much bigger and 
stronger than the two PLAN Marine brigades, which are located in the region in 
Zhanjiang. Blasko highlights, “This development points to the ground force leadership’s 
efforts to maintain their relevance in times of changing threat and strategic 
environment.”65 
The PLA ground forces have been taking constant measurements to 
improve the main battle tanks (MBT), such as developing its third-generation tanks T-90 
and T-90II (T-98) with significant improvements in design, armor, and firepower, and 
armored personnel carriers (APC) and infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) such as T-85, T-86 
and T-90 IFV, which are wheeled, with a rapid cruise speed, maneuverability, agility, and 
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a greater fire power, such as 12.7 mm or 25 mm cannons and anti-armor missiles.66 The 
PLA has had formidable artillery and air defense weapons with increasing mobility. 
Instead of being towed, artillery and air defense pieces mounted on tracked self-propelled 
vehicles has become a main effort of the PLA. The most modern artillery weapons are the 
155-mm and 203-mm self-propelled howitzers (SPH) which have a modest speed, great 
accuracy and distance. The most advanced and recent acquisition of air defense systems 
is the SA-10 (S-300) purchased from Russia in 1995, in addition to a number of 
indigenous surface-to-air-missiles, such as a cloned version of S-300, HQ-61A, FT-2000 
(advertised as “AWACs killer”), and a variety of multiple rocket launchers. Overall, 
China acquires one of the largest arsenals of these two systems and besides formidable, 
they are getting better. 
Due to their doctrine and technology modernization, the roles and 
missions of the services have expanded. According to the 2008 Defense White Paper, the 
role of “The Army aims at moving from regional defense to trans-regional mobility, and 
improving its capabilities in air-ground integrated operations, long distance maneuvers, 
rapid assaults and special operations.”67 This reflects that while decreasing the units from 
divisions to brigades, ground forces have been upgrading their “mechanization” by 
increasing the number of trucks, tracks, and wheeled fighting vehicles. Moreover, armor 
systems are ameliorating as mobile artillery and air defense pieces are increasing. The 
PLA is placing far greater emphasis on building up its Aviation Corps, Special Forces, 
and Information Warfare units.68 
2. PLA Air Force 
a. Mission 
The PLAAF role is increasing and was given a high priority beginning in 
the early 1990s. Along with the development of the military strategy, the PLA Air Force 
(PLAAF) has begun its transition from territorial defense to both offensive and defensive 
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operations. One unique distinction of the PLAAF has been an enclosure of Air Defense 
Forces. It might seem that the PLAAF has a much broader responsibility and potential, 
but it divides the air defense role because the PLA Navy (PLAN) has aviation forces as 
well. The 2008 Defense White Paper describes the PLAAF responsibility as safeguarding 
the country’s territorial air space and territorial sovereignty and maintaining a stable air 
defense posture nationwide.69 Saunders and Quam note, “The PLAAF was designed as a 
defensive force charged with the primary mission of air defense and a secondary mission 
of support for the ground forces. Air defense capabilities included defending China’s 
airfield, other critical infrastructure, political and economic centers, and ground forces. 
The PLAAF was also charged with supporting ground troops via close air support and 
bombing operations, but has never really been able to perform this mission.”70 
b. Size 
Due to the rising role of the air force, the PLAAF was not affected like the 
PLA ground forces in terms of personnel.  The number of combat aircrafts, however, was 
significantly reduced in order to build a smaller but more capable air force by retiring and 
replacing outmoded aircrafts. Lanzit and Allen declared in their work,  
Since the early 1990s, PLAAF has decreased total personnel strength from 
490,000 to less than 400,000, reduced combat aircraft from more than 
5,000 to about 2,000 and air divisions from 50 to 28, and decreased the 
average number of regiments per air division from three to two as well as 
the number of aircraft per regiment.71  
Shambaugh states, “The PLAAF deploys some 3,000 aircraft, 2,200 of 
them are various models of J-6s and J-7s, which were built in the 1960s, and about 400 
Q-5s, which is a first indigenously designed aircraft.  Additionally, the PLAAF only 
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deploys 250 J-8 IIs and few JH-7 fighters.”72 Therefore, one can asses that while retiring 
its obsolete aircraft families, China has been persistently attempting to acquire and build 
newer, more modern and more capable aircrafts. 
c. Capability and Modernization 
The 2006 White Paper states, “The Air Force aims at speeding up its 
transition from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations, and 
increasing its capabilities in the areas of air strike, sir and missile defense, early warning 
and reconnaissance and strategic projection.”73 Accordingly, the PLAAF started to 
acquire new fourth-generation multirole fighters as its doctrinal literature stresses 
coordination with missile and naval strikes. In addition, the PLAAF has been devoting 
considerable resources to the development of new fifth-generation combat aircraft and 
unmanned surveillance and combat aircraft. The PLAAF is acquiring new bombers 
armed with land attack cruise missiles, developing and producing a variety of Precision 
Guided Munitions (PGM), and planning to build a new class of large transport aircraft.74   
Despite recent research and development of new combat aircraft, their 
numbers remain small compared with Chinese overall air force structure; the new 
generation aircraft J-10, Su-27, and Su-30 fighters constitute only 10 percent of the 
combined air force and navy combat aircraft force.75 Though the number of fourth-
generation aircraft is limited, by 2007 the PLA had about 280 Su-27s, Su-30s, and co-
produced J-11 fighters. By 2010, the PLAAF may be able to deploy integrated strike 
packages of multirole fighters with modern support elements such as airborne radar, 
electronic warfare, and aerial refueling platforms that are able to undertake autonomous 
or joint-force offensive missions.   
Recently, the PLAAF has ordered more Il-76 and Il-78 (tanker version) 
transport aircrafts, and acquired Mi-17 and KA-28 helicopters and S-300 surface-to-air-
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missiles (SAM). Domestically, the PLAAF received 60 new J-10 fighters and B-6 aerial 
refueling tankers.  However, it has not significantly succeeded on the domestic 
development program for strategic bombers and airborne early warning and control 
(AEW&C) aircraft.76 China is continuously upgrading its air defense capability by 
acquiring S-300s and TorM1/SA-15s from Russia and developing new indigenously 
produced models. Furthermore, China is probably acquiring S-400/SA-20 system to 
extend air defense coverage over the coastal areas. 
3. PLA Navy 
a. Mission 
Historically, Chinese military had emphasis on ground forces because, 
since the foundation of the PRC, the major security threats had been internal security, and 
continental threats were primarily from the Soviet Union and the United States. Mao’s 
proclamation of the “people’s war” concept strongly supported this suspicion or notion 
and deeply affected the mission orientation, strategic guidance, and priority within the 
branches. Chinese leaders emphasized the important role of maritime forces. Up to the 
end of the 1970s, China had not taken decisive measures to modernize its navy assets. 
However, weakening of the people’s war concept, which focuses on luring a 
technologically superior enemy deep into the Chinese territory, contradicted with Chinese 
economic development and the opening of its coastal areas for investors. Cole highlights 
the importance of the region as: 
The Asia-Pacific region is a major factor in global trade.  Half of world’s 
twenty largest container lines are owned and based in Asia; eighteen of the 
world’s largest container ports are located in the region.  About one-third 
of the world’s shipping is owned by Asian nations.77 
Consequently, for the last two and half decades, China has emphasized the importance of 
a formidable naval force and has acquired up-to-date battle ships and submarines. China 
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has also been working tirelessly on building its own carrier group project and  
improving and producing domestic naval ships and subs.  
The 2008 Defense White Paper defines the main tasks of the PLAN are 
safeguarding China’s maritime security and maintaining the sovereignty of its territorial 
waters, along with its maritime rights and interests. It continues, “From the 1950s to the 
end of the 1970s the main task of the Navy was to conduct inshore defensive operations. 
Since the 1980s, the Navy has realized a strategic transformation to offshore defensive 
operations.78 Cole describes this notion:  
A state’s jurisdiction over the land is simply pushed seaward in terms of 
rights and duties concerning good order, the exploitation of resources and 
the exercise of limited sovereignty.  This concept includes “environmental 
concerns, nationalism and above all, economic exploitation.” “Sovereignty 
protection” is now a high priority naval mission.79 
With tension decreasing and normal relationship between China and Russia 
resuming due to the demise of the Communist system, along with the evolution of 
doctrine from fighting total (nuclear) war in the mainland to local and limited war in the 
Chinese peripheries, China certainly underscored the importance of naval forces and its 
mission. 
b. Size 
The Military Balance 2010 estimates that PLAN has a total manpower of 
255,000 people. It has five service arms: submarine, surface, naval aviation, coastal 
defense, and Marine Corps. There are three fleets: the Beihai (North Sea), Donghai (East 
Sea), and Nanhai (South Sea) fleets.80 Godwin’s article cites that PLAN’s personnel were 
reduced from 350,000 in 1985 to 260,000 in 1995.81 The evidences suggest that since 
1995, PLAN did not reduce its personnel notably, which manifested the growing 
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significance of navy in the Chinese security building. Though the number of naval 
personnel decreased during the initial reduction of the Chinese forces between 1985 and 
1997, the number of ships, subs, and aviation assets has been increasing steadily along 
with the growing military expenditure. As mentioned earlier, the modern Chinese leaders 
have given the foremost importance to the naval and air force modernization in order to 
acquire the power projection capability. The Chinese Navy deploys a total of 80 surface 
combatants, including 28 destroyers and 52 frigates. Most modern ships are four 
Sovremenny class destroyers. The PLAN possesses 65 submarines, including one Xia and 
two Jin class subs for strategic purposes that are considered capable of firing nuclear 
warhead missiles. In addition, a number of patrol crafts and coastal vessels constitute a 
vital segment of the navy. Besides PLAAF, the Chinese navy has aviation forces based 
on coastal air bases and it deploys 290 aircrafts, including bombers and helicopters. 
Though established recently, 10,000 marines are the major amphibious force of the 
navy.82 
c. Capability and Modernization 
The 2008 Defense White Paper states,  
In the line with the requirements of offshore defense strategy, the Navy 
takes informationization as the orientation and strategy priority of its 
modernization drive, and is endeavoring to build a strong navy. It deepens 
reforms and innovations in training programs and methods, highlights 
training in maritime integrated joint operations, and enhances integrated 
combat capability in conducting offshore campaigns and the capability of 
nuclear counterattacks.83  
Most of PLAN’s assets are 20- to 30-year-old ships that been reverse-
engineered and upgraded many times and have modest capabilities.  Only a few that, 
have entered into the Chinese naval service recently have blue-water capability. The 
majority has been capable of operating in green and brown water. The most advanced 
surface ships are four Russian Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers, which were 
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designed to escort and to destroy aircraft carriers, particularly U.S. carriers and their 
Aegis escorts.84 Chinese leaders realized that without a capable Navy, it had true strategic 
vulnerabilities when engaged in limited wars in the peripheries, especially in the case of 
Taiwan separatists. Therefore, China has been acquiring a new ship every year, and 
surface ship forces have been the leading segment of the PLAN modernization. The most 
conspicuous of the surface forces are destroyers and frigates that are both armed with 
anti-surface ship cruise missiles (SSM). All these ships are designed to be multi-mission-
capable, which means they could fulfill a variety of missions, such as anti-surface 
(ASUW), antisubmarine (ASW) and anti-air warfare (AAW).85 China continues to 
modify these warfighting capabilities in the indigenous ships such as Luhu, Luhai, Luda 
destroyers and Jiangway and Jianghu frigates. However, most of the weapons, sensors, 
command and control, and engines have been imported and Chinese ship builders need to 
improve in order to build China’s own formidable ship forces.  Additionally, since 2000, 
the PLAN has commissioned 17 amphibious warfare ships as it modifies doctrine and 
strategy.  
Although lightly armed, the Yuting-class landing ships have helicopter 
landing platforms, which increases the ability to transport mission-ready forces 
horizontally. Even bigger landing ships were introduced in late 2006 that were capable of 
deploying at least four helicopters and four air-cushion landing crafts and embarking at 
least 400 troops.86  
The PLAN had only one strategic ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the 
Type 092 Xia-class, though has had lots of engineering and construction problems. It was 
the first nuclear-powered submarine armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) carrying nuclear warheads.87 Jin-class SSBNs, which are capable of carrying 
sixteen JL-2 ballistic missiles with a range of 8,000 kilometers,88 are supposed to replace 
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Xia. The Military Balance 2010 states that even though operational status are unknown, 
the PLAN possesses two Jin-class submarines and another two are under construction.89 
Both Shambaugh and Cole express that when China succeeds and proves its ability to 
produce its SSBN armed with ICBM, it will substantially augment China’s sea-based 
nuclear deterrent. Besides, these submarines that are nuclear-powered and equipped with 
ballistic missiles, the PLAN has a formidable conventional submarine force. So far, 
China has deployed 12 indigenously produced Song-class submarines and purchased 12 
Russian-built Kilo-class boats, which are evaluated by Cole as “hitherto one of the very 
best conventionally-powered submarines (SS).90  
In addition to the aforementioned surface and submarine vessels and assets, China 
is strongly interested in possessing an aircraft-carrier capability. Although not 
substantiated, China is willing to have a carrier battle group, and it has been 
implementing a big project to do research and development to build its own. Chinese 
leaders are fully aware of blue water navy or power projection capability and envy 
Thailand and India, who have their own carriers. China purchased several 
decommissioned carriers, the HMAS Melbourne from Australia, the Varyag from 
Ukraine, and the Minsk from Russia. Though China has claimed to use them for civilian 
purposes, Chinese engineers probably conducted detailed research, and there are reports 
that Chinese naval pilots are training takeoffs and landings on a simulated flight deck 
copied from the HMAS Melbourne.91 
4. Second Artillery 
The Second Artillery consists of nuclear and non-nuclear missile forces for the 
PLA and is the well-developed branch within the PLA. Though China has been pursuing 
the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, 
the PLA pace to increase the quantity of ICBM, non-nuclear, medium and short-range 
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ballistic missiles, and land attack cruise missiles is growing fast.92 It is obvious that 
China has deployed a number of missiles to use against a possible confrontation with the 
United States if a war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait; however, the exact number of the 
missiles is not transparent due to the absence of publication of related data. 
The Second Artillery is a strategic force under the direct command and control of 
the CMC, and the core force of China for strategic deterrence. It is mainly responsible for 
deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against China, and for conducting 
nuclear counterattacks and precision strikes with conventional missiles.93 In other 
publications, the Second Artillery has three missions: deterring nuclear aggression 
against China, preventing nuclear coercion, and conferring great power status/eliciting 
deference.94  Since the establishment of the missile forces, China truly achieved a basic 
second-strike capability since it has been threatened by global super-powers such as the 
Soviet Union and the United States. During the dual-adversary period China was 
preparing to defeat massive Soviet forces using its own nuclear arsenals. Therefore, 
Chinese nuclear force has been a major deterring tool for the entire history of the PRC, 
and China undoubtedly has pursued the ambitious program to improve them. Medeiros 
states that the Second Artillery is one of the most dynamic branches of an already active 
and rapidly modernizing PLA, and it may even assume new missions, such as counter-
space operations.95 Shambaugh says, “If Chinese military has any truly modern 
capability, it lies in the realm of ballistic missiles.”96 
The Military Balance 2010 suggests that the Second Artillery has a total of 
100,000+ personnel. Since the mid-1980s, China has expanded the size and improved the 
quality of the Chinese missile forces in an effort to enhance their reliability, survivability, 
response time, and most recently and urgently their penetrability.  China’s nuclear forces 
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are moving beyond their decades-long reliance on land-based, liquid-fuel, silo-based 
missile systems to solid-fuel, and road-mobile missiles with various ranges.97 According 
to Yuan’s statement, China deploys a range of missiles including 20 DF-5As (CSS-4), 22 
DF-4s (CSS-3), 16 DF-3As (CSS-2) and DF-21As (CSS-5). Solid-fuel, long range DF-
31s and DF-31As have been under construction. The latter two missiles have been under 
development since 1985 and they are three-stage, solid-propellant, mobile missiles on a 
transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). DF-31 series are capable of reaching targets 
throughout Asia, Europe, Russia, and the United States.98 The Military Balance 2010, 
however, suggests that Chinese nuclear forces already possessed 12 DF-31s (CSS-9), 24 
DF-31As in the inventory. Though it decreased the number DF-4s, the Second Artillery 
has kept all DF-5As operational. As a result, Chinese nuclear forces now deploy 66 
ICBMs with incredible range, and possess 118 IRBMs, of which almost all are solid-fuel 
missiles.99 Besides nuclear missiles, the Second Artillery deploys conventional SRBMs 
(DF-15).   
Most recently, in 2007, China successfully tested a direct-ascent, anti-satellite 
(ASAT) weapon, destroying a non-operational weather satellite.100 The test demonstrated 
the PLA’s ability to attack satellites operating in low-Earth orbit and raised concern on 
China’s growing and unprecedented missile defense capability. Besides this test, China is 
pursuing ambitious programs for space exploration and developing cyberwarfare 
capabilities. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Even though China’s unprecedented economic growth has enabled it to spend a 
great amount of money on military modernization there is a huge gap, which requires a 
great deal of effort and an extensive period of time, between Chinese and Western 
defense technologies. The Gulf War and Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 opened the PLA 
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experts and commanders’ eyes that modern warfare comparatively differs from the 
strategy that China was focusing: the “limited war under high-technology conditions.” 
The shocking effect of the PLA commanders and CCP leaders forced Chinese military 
modernization, mostly contingency driven, and it started the procurement program 
(particularly from Russia) of navy destroyers and submarines and Su-27 and Su-30 
fighters. This shock was worsened by the Kosovo crisis and NATO interventions, and 
this time it had a profound effect on not only military but also national leaders. 
Particularly, NATO forces’ capability to engage information (IF) and electronic warfare 
(EF), improved accuracy of cruise missiles and other munitions equipped with satellite 
and laser guidance systems, and stealth airplanes with in-flight fueling capacity (longer 
operational distance). Consequently, the PLA continued to witness high technology 
warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as new ordnances such as extremely 
sophisticated PGMs, which had far more advanced accuracy and lethality than witnessed 
in the Gulf War and Bosnia. Moreover, PLA analysts noted the importance of an 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and special operations forces that greatly improved 
allied intelligence.101As a result, China has launched a great effort to modernize its 
military and implement huge projects to catch up with the leading military powers. The 
PLA transformation, however, is being implemented with far fewer financial resources 
than the U.S. Army transformation of 1970s and 1980s.102  
The modernization projects has impacted almost every part of the PLA, including 
doctrine and training, structure, procurement of weapons systems, and military industries. 
The modernization, however, did not really affect the top-level decision making process.  
Both Central Military Commissions led by President Hu Jintao and the Chinese 
Communist Party still retain the foremost influence on military decisions though two 
members of the politburo have been generals for last two terms and the minister of 
national defense is a military person as well. The term “Party-Army relationship” has 
faded; instead, the term “Civil-Military relationship has been mentioned recently. 
However, the CCP remains the sole decision-making force when it comes to reform in 
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the PLA. Therefore, radical reform in the civilian control over military has been avoided 
explicitly because it could touch the overall legitimacy of the communist government of 
China.103 
Many intellectuals have done research on Chinese military modernization though 
they were often frustrated with the ambiguity of the data and updates of military weapon 
systems and manpower.  Nonetheless, Chinese military analysts and military leaders have 
been aware of rapidly developing military technology and the revolution in military 
affairs; the PLA has been under a substantial evolution, and thorough ongoing revision of 
the warfighting doctrine, strategy, tactics, and training in recent years.104 After the Mao’s 
death, Deng Xiaoping and the leading marshals and generals began to revise Mao’s 
“people’s war” doctrine that focused on the excessively defensive posture of fighting 
adversaries deep inside China in a war of attrition.  Deng observed this doctrine was not 
appropriate to his new doctrine of a “people’s war under modern conditions” which 
emphasized active defense in the frontiers.105 
Since Deng’s initiated modernization the PLA had struggled through the different 
doctrinal changes due to the rapidly changing technology. In 1990s, the PLA transformed 
its doctrine to be applicable to “limited war under high-technology conditions.” 
Moreover, the PLA has grasped the importance of informational warfare in contemporary 
warfare.106 For that reason, Li states, “In 2002, the CMC adopted the policy of ‘dual-
track’ modernization termed ‘mechanization and informationization’—which would be 
implemented through the new concept of ‘integrated joint operations.”107 
The PLA has had seven MRs since Beijing reduced the previous eleven districts 
in 1985. However, notable physical force deployment has not been experienced except a 
substantial demobilization of service personnel since the mid-1980s (approximately 1.1 
million between 1985 and 1996, and an additional 500,000 from 1996 to 2000) and some 
organizational changes. The main reason of the large-scale demobilization was the 
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decline of the potential Soviet threat; however, this is also an indication of the regime’s 
desire to create a real internal paramilitary force and to downsize the PLA’s gigantic 
forces and to alter it into a more effective fighting force.108 Except from a significant 
buildup, particularly short and medium-range ballistic missiles, in the Nanjing MR since 
the early 1990s, the PLA has not increased the forces in the south, and ground forces 
remain stationed in the north of the capital.   
 Overall, China is experiencing a transformation and modernization of its military 
forces and technologies. Even the PLA is effectively doing research on high-tech 
weapons, such as weapons using lasers and radio frequency, thermo baric weapons, 
hypersonic and unmanned vehicles, and electromagnetic weapons.109 China still lags 
behind the leading militaries in the world.  However, China has been attempting hard to 
build the power projection capability and consolidate its regional reputation. By doing so, 
China is securing its interests in various fields in the region. In particular, China is 
relentlessly seeking cheap and reliable resources to satiate its growing energy and 
resource needs. How this modernization will affect the neighboring countries, especially 
Mongolia, is assessed in the following chapter. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR MONGOLIAN SECURITY 
With the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Union withdrawal of troops from 
Asia, China revived its ambition to dominate in the region as the leap-frog economic 
performance enabled it to intensify the PLA modernization. Mongolia is one of the 
countries who has accommodated China’s rise, despite the fear and animosity that exists 
strongly in Mongolians’ minds.110 Gradually China replaced Russia as the most 
influential state in the Asia-Pacific region, though Russia has recovered from the crisis 
period and realized the looming potential of China. However, it is still too early that 
Russia is a competitive power with China in the various fields of the society and 
economics, though not in military. Both countries have been actively reforming their 
military and there is a common understanding that these two countries have been 
competing for the regional leading power status. According to Bobo Lo’s claim, 
however, “China’s aggregate military power now exceeds Russia or will do so shortly. 
Despite the decline of the Russian armed forces, they nevertheless continue to enjoy 
several critical advantages, above all several thousand nuclear warheads.”111  
The recent history of Mongolia relates closely to the history of Tsarist Russia and 
the Soviet Union, after Mongolia declared independence in 1911 from the declining Qing 
dynasty. The main notion to lean toward Russia or the Soviet Union was mainly stemmed 
from the fear of being dominated by the newly formed Republic of China. As a result, for 
almost seven decades Mongolia had been a satellite state of the Soviet Union, and 
Mongolia’s foreign and domestic policy had been shaped by the guidance of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Though the close relations with the Soviet 
Union guaranteed Mongolia’s independence, it was not free. Tsedendamba Batbayar 
mentions that “after seven decades of alignment with and domination by the Soviet 
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Union, Mongolians had lost many links with their past.”112 Therefore, after the collapse 
the Soviet Union, Mongolia began to pursue its own national interests and priorities were 
given to the greater global community and the third neighbors. Yet, the priority direction 
of Mongolia’s foreign relations is given to Russia and China. Narangoa highlights that 
“Mongolia’s two big neighbors’ economic, political, and military conditions still had a 
strong impact, but Mongolia was determined not to rely on one single country and rather 
to have a multi-pillar policy.”113 
Though China seems unlikely to use force against Mongolia, due to China’s 
contemporary economic and political situation, the ambiguity of military rise and 
modernization raises concerns. As many analysts, intellectuals, and officials question, 
why has China been assiduously expanding its military capability and modernizing 
equipment and weaponry? There are a number of opinions, such as seeking a great-power 
status, preparing a large-scale deterring force against Washington, or just for prestige. In 
Mongolia’s case, the Chinese dominance in the regional relations seems imminent.  
A. HAUNTING HISTORY OF MONGOLIA 
Until the seventeenth century when Mongolia fell under the control of the Qing 
dynasty, the Mongols were a major regional power with formidable military 
organizations and skills. However, the arrival of modern arms in the region and the 
dwarfed number of Mongolians created an unfavorable condition. Since the seventeenth 
century, Mongolians have been involved and influenced deeply by the long struggle 
between Russia and China for hegemony in Northeast Asia. Therefore, the main political 
strategy was to play off the imperial rivals against each other. During the strongest 
Chinese Dynasty in its history, which is the Qing dynasty, the foreign affair department 
had an office responsible only for the Mongolian issue.114 
Mongolia’s actions and interactions with immediate neighbors were largely 
determined by geostrategic studies. Because of the country’s geography, Mongolia has 
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always been threatened with domination by its neighbors. Mongolian leaders confronted 
this problem twice in Mongolia’s history: in 1691 and in 1911. The first time, 
Mongolians became a part of the Qing dynasty, more for cultural and religious reasons, 
though fought against the Qing dominance for the long period. The second time, with the 
Qing dynasty’s collapse, the Mongolians confronted the looming threat of rising Chinese 
influence, and Mongolia sought to earn its independence with the assistance of the Tsarist 
Russia.  Mongolia did this due to its assessment of its threatened geographical position; 
military, political, and demographical vulnerability; limited foreign affairs; their desire to 
develop its own way of development after the long period of Qing’s rule; and fear of 
domination and eventual assimilation by China.115  
However, Russia and China again played a thorny political game, which ignored 
the fate of Mongolians again.  In 1913, they agreed Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia, 
which proved that Mongolia’s desire to escape from Chinese control would not be 
achieved easily. Despite agreeing Mongolia’s autonomy arranged in 1915 in Kyakhta, 
China retook control over Mongolia in 1919 and destroyed the autonomy when the 
October Bolshevik revolution in 1917 engendered political turmoil in Russia. Finally, 
Mongolia had the opportunity to gain its independence, and this time the Soviet Union 
helped the Mongol Army to fight against the Chinese troops stationed in Mongolia.116 
With the support from the Soviet Union, Mongolia had an opportunity to proclaim its 
independence from the ROC, and the rationale for declaring the independence was 
claiming that Manchu people controlled Mongolian territory, but not Chinese territory. 
Shortly after the independence in 1924, Bogd Khan died. He was the religious leader of 
Mongolia. Right after his death, Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) declared Mongolia as 
the world’s second socialist country, with the altered designation of the Mongolian 
People’s Republic. Ganbaatar Donrov highlights in his work that there were several 
factors that caused Mongolia to side with the Soviets: 
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— Opposing China was one important commonality between Mongolia 
and Russia, where Mongolian national interests coincided with Russian 
strategic interests.  
— Russian threat was indirect. The Soviets were unlikely to move in, 
dominate, and assimilate the Mongols as China demonstrated through the 
takeover of Inner Mongolia. 
— Improved health and education assured physical survival for Mongols.  
— The Soviets provided comparatively large economic assistance.117 
From 1921 through 1990, Mongolia was under complete patronage of the Soviet 
Union though not a Soviet republic. Consequently, it could not pursue an independent 
foreign policy.  Moscow’s manner and decisions in foreign relations were a vital aspect 
of Mongolian decision making, and Mongolia always considered Soviet interests and 
guidance when taking any actions. Mongolia played an important role throughout the 
Sino-Soviet hostility in the 1960s and 1970s. The Soviets viewed Mongolia both as a 
buffer and as a “deterrent territory” against China, while China’s main perspective 
considered Mongolia not a big strategic buffer between the Soviet Union and China, 
rather Beijing perceived the Soviet troops in Mongolia as a military threat to northern and 
northwest China.118 
The bottom line is that both Russia and China have not been deeply concerned 
with the fate of Mongolia. Instead, they have taken taking advantage of the buffer 
location between them. Particularly, China is still maintaining a “lost territory” sentiment 
and waiting for the perfect time to reclaim Mongolian territory, albeit not expressing it 
explicitly. China is currently preoccupied over several factors to consider before acting 
on this issue: 
— Taiwan Strait issue 
— Territorial disputes with several neighbors 
— Economic growth and building a prestigious society 
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The aforementioned short history illustrates Mongolia’s necessity to carefully 
pursue an independent policy, whereas Chinese interests backed by its economic 
achievement and military rise and modernization inevitably influence the policy. Since 
the end of the Cold War, the Sino-Russian relationship has substantially improved, and, 
indeed, Russia played a big role on filling the gap between the PLA and the leading 
military forces in the world.  Both Russia and China are pursuing and respecting the 
“strategic cooperative partnership.” In fact, the two governments have increasingly begun 
to side together in voting against the United States and the United Kingdom in the UN 
Security Council and other forums.119 
B. APPLICABLE THEORY ANALYSIS 
In order to find an applicable theory this chapter analyzes some international 
relations theory and attempts to apply it to the Mongolian case.   
According to the realist balance of power perspective, balancing means 
constructing or maintaining equal military capability among great powers in order to 
prevent a single strong state or alliance achieve dominance in international relations. In 
Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz defines balancing as “joining a weaker 
side to prevent a dominating and threatening force” and bandwagoning as “joining a 
strong coalition or state.”120 Similarly, Stephen Walt contends that states may either 
balance or bandwagon when they face a significant external threat. Balancing is defined 
as allying with others against the prevailing threat; bandwagoning refers to alignment 
with the source of danger. When bandwagoning dominates, security is challenged greatly 
due to an aggressor’s attraction of other partners; in contrast, if balancing is more 
widespread, international politics is more secure because of plentiful opposition forces 
against a more threatened state. 121  According to Walt’s argument states balance for two 
main reasons: first, align with peer states in order to prevent the domination of stronger 
states; second, join the weaker side to increase or present its influence. This hypothesis, 
                                                 
119 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 288–289. 
120  Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 116–123. 
121 Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 
(Spring 1985), 4. 
 50
however, does not apply well to the Mongolian case. Due to China and Russia’s 
relatively large size, power, and economy, Mongolia’s support does not make any 
difference. If Mongolia joins one side, its influence does not deeply affect or change the 
total course of action.   
According to Hans Morgenthau’s classical argument, an inherently ambitious and 
dominant character of human beings primarily shapes a state’s policy, which makes it 
greedy and violent. Therefore, cooperation hardly exists in the international politics due 
to a constant power struggle between states, which derives from this greedy and dominant 
behavior of the states to maximize power.122 This theory cannot apply well to the 
Mongolia-Chinese relationship, because there is a friendly cooperation between the two 
countries, though not forever. It is apparent that China would easily swallow Mongolia, if 
cooperation China deeply infiltrates every field of Mongolia’s economy and society. As a 
consequence, Mongolians keep certain distance within their relationship China, as it 
gives first priority of the foreign relations policy to Mongolia’s two immediate neighbors.  
Similarly, neorealist theorists, such as Kenneth Waltz, argue that sovereign and 
powerful states look for the most favorable conditions in international relations. Due to 
the absence of the hierarchy system, the international system is anarchic, and there is no 
overarching authority to adjudicate when a dispute arises; states depend on their own 
power for protection. Strong states seek to control weaker states; however, weaker states 
are not willing to comply. As a result, war is most likely to occur and weaker states take 
the strong defense measurements to make them powerful.123 Definitely, Mongolia is not 
willing to go to war against this unmatched force and any military defensive 
measurements seem unproductive. Yet, it has a desire not to be controlled by either 
neighbor. The theory applies well to China’s position that it certainly wants to control the 
vast Mongolian plateau and does not want to involve other countries.   
In contrast to the above hypotheses, Mongolia definitely does not want to rely on 
one single country or source for its survival because the aforesaid theories predict that 
weak countries do not expect a long-lasting benevolent attitude from the strong hawkish 
                                                 
122 Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1978), 17–30. 
123 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 122.  
 51
states. Instead, the balancing and bandwagoning theory could apply to Mongolia’s third 
neighbor search policy. According to balancing and bandwagoning theory, Mongolia 
cooperates with strong states to balance with its immediate neighbors, though the method 
for doing this is limited. This does not mean third neighbor policy would become the 
priority direction of Ulaanbaatar’s foreign policy, which has been maintaining friendly 
relations with the Russian Federation and the PRC.  More detailed analyses of third-
neighbor policies are mentioned in the following chapters.  
Constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt, argue that at the international level, 
cooperation or competence between states depends on how strong social relationships 
are. Even though states might not get along with each other well, their preferences might 
change after a certain period of social interaction. Additionally, constructivists consider 
common culture, norms, and interests as well as identities are very important in shaping 
successful international cooperation between states, despite anarchy. Moreover, identities 
and interests of states are not fixed, but rather states have interactions that change 
them.124 It is possible that social interactions could change the states.  Mongolia, of 
course, has stronger social ties with its two neighbors rather than other countries.  In 
particular, due to increasing economic activities between the two countries, in both state 
and individual levels, the Sino-Mongolian relationship has been flourishing in recent 
years. Mongolians are, however, skeptical to share common culture, norms, and interests 
with China, though there are ethnic Mongolians in China. The major reason has been fear 
of assimilation and losing traditional customs, heritages, and cultural aspects.  
 Professor Narangoa, an associate professor at the Australian National University 
in Canberra, claims that Mongolia has successfully exercised “preventive diplomacy.” 
She contends that Mongolia has limited foreign policy options; however, it recognizes its 
ability to survive because it played an important role as a buffer between Russia and 
China. Furthermore, Mongolian policy makers speculate that Mongolia can move beyond 
buffer status to exercise a broader role in the region. Narangoa continues, “For this  
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reason, Mongolians have adopted a preventive diplomacy designed to avert future 
conflicts with and deflect pressures from its two big neighbors, which both have 
threatened Mongolia during the last century.”125   
 The term “preventive diplomacy” was first introduced by U.N. Secretary-General 
Dag Hammarskjöld in 1960 and received particular attention when Secretary-General 
Boutros conceptualized it in his Agenda for Peace. According to Boutros-Ghali’s 
definition, preventive diplomacy is “action to prevent disputes from arising between 
parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread 
of the latter when they occur.”  The objective of preventive diplomacy is ‘to seek to 
identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce a conflict, and try 
through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results.’”126 A 
preventive diplomacy could be an alternative for Mongolia, but it does not fully 
guarantee its survival.  Moreover, the term “elude from a conflict through diplomatic 
means” sounds like accommodating.   
China’s looming military and economic rise could possess a serious threat to 
Mongolian security, so Ulaanbaatar should consolidate its neutrality position. Neutrality 
has been possible for Mongolia because of the following reasons: implementing a non-
involvement policy for its two neighbors (will not side either one); having no territorial 
disputes with any countries in the region; maintaining friendly relations with every 
country in the region, especially with both South and North Korea; possessing unbiased 
attitude in any disputes between the countries in the region and possibly farther; and 
posing no potential threat and capability to any country in the region. This might be 
another theory, maintaining neutrality, which could possibly provide applicability to 
Mongolia’s case.   
To conclude, a small country, such as Mongolia, needs a flexible multilateral 
policy that guarantees its survival and shapes its stature in the regional and global 
community. Unfortunately, the biggest disadvantage of a small country depends on the 
recognition or awareness of its independent policy by other countries. For this reason, 
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small countries should make noticeable contributions to international and regional 
stability and order, though freedom of movement is limited. Mongolia cannot simply 
apply a single international relations theory for its foreign policy approach. Instead, a 
proper cluster of balancing, bandwagoning, accommodating, being neutral, and 
preventing are applicable for its unique situation. 
C. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MONGOLIA AND ITS IMMEDIATE 
NEIGHBORS AND OTHER COUNTRIES 
Like other nations, Mongolia needs peace and friendly relations with its 
neighbors. Mongolia’s main relationships are aimed toward the two large neighbors that 
separate it from the rest of the world. Throughout the Cold War, Mongolian foreign 
relations were based on a single source—the Soviet Union. With the domination of the 
Soviet Union and its antagonism with the PRC, Mongolia had no choice, but tilted toward 
the Soviet Union, and proclaimed the PRC as the greatest potential adversary. In fact, 
Mongolia had a glimpse of a good relationship with China when Moscow and Beijing 
enjoyed a fraternal relationship during the 1950s. Unfortunately, this relationship did not 
last long, and the Sino-Soviet split caused Mongolia’s alienation from one of its only two 
neighbors. Of course, Mongolia did not have a choice, but leaned to Moscow for 
pragmatic reasons. 
Gratefully, the demise of the Soviet Union and the Communist system allowed 
Mongolia to implement independent foreign policy. When Mongolia changed its political 
system, the newly elected legislation and government announced that Mongolia must 
pursue a multilateral, nonaligned, and neutral foreign policy. Following the new 
constitution, Mongolian parliament has passed several important laws and documents, 
and one of them was the Concept of the Foreign Relations. According to this document 
Mongolia’s foreign policy priority shall be the Russian Federation and the PRC with 
strategic partnership relations.   
Therefore, Mongolia should continue its current foreign policy with the leading 
priority being its relationship with its two neighbors while effectively seeking a potential 
third neighbor to balance their power and strengthening Mongolia’s position and 
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reputation in regional and international organizations. This chapter discusses Mongolia’s 
relations with its only two neighbors and with its most potential third neighbors, such as 
the United States and Japan. Of course, relations with other countries, such as the 
European Union (EU), South Korea, and India, have developed greatly during recent 
years, but the relations with the United States and Japan have the greatest relationship to 
and influence on Mongolian-Chinese relations. 
1. Mongolian-Chinese Relationship 
Historically, Mongolia and China have been rivalries for centuries. The main 
reason of building the Great Wall was the nomadic warriors who dwelled in the north of 
China. Nevertheless, everything changed, and in the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Mongolia became a small, land-locked, poor country with blurry sovereignty and 
dependent on its two large neighbors. It was true that following the Qing dynasty’s 
collapse, China discourteously claimed that Mongolia had been the Chinese indivisible 
part long before. This notion has determined the Mongolian-Chinese relationship until 
recently. Though both had been socialist countries, Beijing and Ulaanbaatar’s 
cooperation was mainly antagonizing, apart from the brief period during the 1950s. 
Although, this situation changed after the Soviet Union’s collapse and China and 
Mongolia have been enjoying a good neighborly relationship, the main unofficial factor 
shaping the cautious attitude of Mongolians toward China has been the fear of being 
assimilated by the Chinese. Additionally, the firmness of China’s benign policy toward 
Mongolia could be fragile, as Mongolia consolidates its democratic achievements and 
improves its relations with other democratic states and institutions. 
a. Political Aspects 
After almost three decades of rejecting Mongolian independence, the 
Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist government acknowledged it, and in 1950, the Communist 
China recognized Mongolia as an independent state. The Sino-Soviet joint statement of 
1950 said, “Mongolian independence has been guaranteed as a result of the plebiscite in 
1945 and the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the MPR and the 
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PRC.”127 In the onset of the Sino-Soviet split, Mongolia concluded a border agreement 
with the PRC in 1962, which was the indication to the Chinese Communist government 
to cooperate with Mongolia in order to attract Mongolians. However, alarmed and 
intimidated by the absorption, Mongolia leaned toward the Soviet Union. This caused the 
Mongolian-Chinese relationship to be hostile and antagonizing for three decades or until 
the demise of the Soviet-led socialist bloc. Since 1990, the two countries’ relationship has 
been developing and improving successfully in all areas. 
In 1994, both sides signed the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation 
between China and Mongolia, laying the political and legal foundation for the healthy 
and steady development of their relations. Visits of the high-ranking officials resumed. In 
December 1998, at the invitation of President Jiang Zemin, President of Mongolia N. 
Bagabandi paid a state visit to China. Both sides issued a Sino-Mongolian joint 
statement, deciding to establish neighborly, friendly relations and cooperation into the 
twenty-first century based on long-term stability and sound trust to point out the course 
for the development of the bilateral relations in the future. In June 2003, President Hu 
Jintao paid a state visit to Mongolia. Both sides declared to establish a neighborly and 
mutual-trusting partnership between China and Mongolia, and issued a joint statement.128   
Mongolian President Elbegdorj paid a state visit to China from April 28 to 
May 4, 2010, held official talks with President Hu Jintao, and met with premier Wen 
Ziabao and other officials. At the official talks, the two Heads of State exchanged views 
and opinions on the current level of Mongol-Chinese bilateral relations, cooperation, and 
possibilities for further expansion of the two countries’ relations. One essential subject of 
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relations. Increasing trade between the two countries and expanding cooperation on 
mining and infrastructure was remarked by the leaders to be one of the important goals of 
the bilateral cooperation.129 
There are over sixty bilateral treaties and contracts to facilitate the two 
countries’ relationship. After two decades, Ulaanbaatar and Beijing jointly inspected the 
4,676 km land border and modified the border protocol from 2001 to 2004. However, 
China has concerns over the democratic Mongolia’s relationships beyond its two 
neighbors, such as relations with the United States and Japan. 
b. Economic Aspects 
Since it lost the massive patronage assistance from the Soviet Union in 
1990, Mongolia remains under the implementation of the difficult transition of its 
economy, and China has replaced the Soviet Union as a main trading partner. During 
Ziang Zemin’s visit in 1999, U.S.$12 million contracts for soft loan credit and a U.S.$40 
million joint oil refinery contract were signed.130 Mongolia and China resumed trading 
reciprocally, and during past few years, trade between Mongolia and China has 
substantially increased. In 2005, the trade with China accounted for 37.5 percent of the 
total trade of Mongolia. Forty eight percent of total Mongolian exports go to China, while 
27.7 percent of the total imports come from China. Top export items are copper and 
molybdenum, animal hide, skin, cashmere, wool, and wood. Garments, food, flour, rice, 
machinery, and equipment represent the bulk of the imports from China.131   
Additionally, China is one of the main investors in Mongolia, both by the 
amount of investment and the number of companies, with investment mainly in textiles, 
garments, trade, services, and mining. In 2003, Chinese foreign direct investment flows 
are growing in such sectors as geology mining, trade and catering services, engineering 
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construction, construction materials, and light industry. By the end of 2003, 1,000 
Chinese enterprises were registered and invested U.S.$332.8 million in Mongolia.132 In 
2007, China accounted for around 40 percent of total foreign direct investment.133 
Therefore, one could conclude that Sino-Mongolian economic relations are developing 
greatly and both sides have been extremely satisfied with the current economic 
performance. However, Mongolia still strongly aspires to involve third neighbors in its 
economic activities and avoids relying on a single source. Historical compassion toward 
China, moreover, fuels Mongolia’s notion of circumventing direct and dominant 
influence from it. Another big concern has been the very cheap labor force China 
provides, which Mongolia never could compete with, especially in the rapidly developing 
branches such as mining and construction. 
c. Military Aspects 
The Mongolian and Chinese military relationship has been closely related 
to the two countries’ state relationship. When the state relationship had been normal in 
1950s, there was a small scale of exchanges between the two militaries. However, 
parallel with the Sino-Soviet tension, this relationship was cut until 1990. Since then, the 
Ministry of Defense of Mongolia and Defense Ministry of the PRC deepened the 
relationship and started to exchange defense attachés. Since 1990, a number of high-
ranking military leaders reciprocally paid visits, and starting in 1997, Mongolian military 
personnel begun to study in Chinese military academies and schools. In 2005, Minister of 
Defense Sharavdorj paid an official visit to China and held official talks with Chinese 
Defense Minister General Cao Ganchuan. During the visit, the “Treaty of the Bilateral 
Cooperation between Ministry of Defense Mongolia and Chinese Defense Ministry” was 
signed, which has become the major document for the development of future relations.134   
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China has provided annual military assistance worth of 8 million 
Renminbi (RMB) since 1994, and more than 100 officers and NCO have been sent to 
Chinese military schools to study. Beijing and Ulaanbaatar held the Bilateral Consultative 
Committee meeting in 2004 and military delegates from China were invited to observe an 
international peace support field training exercise in Mongolia. China has been keen to 
take part in any possible military exercises and training as observers since then.  
Recently, the two countries’ military tie has expanded furthermore. For example, in 2009, 
Mongolia and China held the first bilateral peacekeeping exercise “Peacekeeping Mission 
2009” in China. Both sides emphasized the significance of the event.   Additionally, high-
ranking officials expressed that the military cooperation and friendship between 
Mongolia and China has been deepened significantly and will be enhanced in the 
future.135 Transparency of the Chinese military leaders in the two countries’ relations, 
however, has been questionable. 
d. Conclusion 
Despite the ups and downs in the Sino-Mongolian relationship for past 
sixty years due to various circumstances, the two countries’ relations have emphasized 
diplomatic recognition, friendship, cooperation, mutual understanding, and assistance. 
Mongolia was one of the first countries that recognized the PRC right after the 
foundation, and the two countries established diplomatic relations in October 1949. 
Though certain factors, such as historic, economic, and military factors, have a large 
influence on the Mongolian’s suspicious sentiment toward China, the two countries have 
been succeeding greatly in developing a friendly and neighborly relationship. Over the 
last 20 years in particular, their relations have developed rapidly and made remarkable 
achievements.   
With its growing need of energy and resources, China has a deep 
aspiration to secure and acquire possession, either partially or wholly, of natural 
resources such as coal, copper, and uranium in Mongolia. While Mongolia’s aspiration of 
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having stable and friendly relations with China is stemmed from its own survival and the 
reality of being landlocked between two larger states, China’s relations with Mongolia 
are based on China’s interest to keep Russia, the United States, and other states away 
from its proximity and natural resources. Additionally, Chinese suspicion of the 
democratic development in Mongolia with other countries fuels this notion as well. 
Although it has promised to keep a friendly relationship with Mongolia, it is uncertain 
whether China would maintain this if its peaceful policy toward Mongolia contradicts 
with other powers’ interests. 
2. Mongolian-Russian Relationship 
After seventy years of being a satellite state, Mongolia strives to maintain cordial 
relations with the Russian Federation. Like the relations with China, however, Mongolia 
avoids establishing too close a relationship with Moscow. Mongolia maintains military 
and military-technical relations with only three nations and one of them is Russia. Most 
of the general infrastructure, edifices, and major factories were built with the assistance 
of the Soviets during the Cold War period, thus Russia still dominates in the heavy 
industry and mining sectors in Mongolia. In contrast, China has become the major 
investor in the light industry and agriculture. Russia still enjoys its share in the two 
largest industries in Mongolia, the “Erdenet” copper mining factory and Mongolian 
Railway that are both state-owned enterprises, which produce the major portion of the 
GDP of Mongolia. Therefore, like China, while Russia wants to maintain close relations 
with Mongolia, it is not pleased with third countries’ involvement and influence in the 
Mongolian plateau. 
a. Political Aspects 
Mongolian recent history after the collapse of the Qing dynasty until the 
end of the Cold War was greatly influenced by Tsarist Russia and later by the Soviet 
Union. In fact, the Soviet Union bestowed the independence of Outer Mongolia from the 
looming threat of the newly established ROC. On the one hand, therefore, Mongolia paid 
the price of what she owed the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Mongolians sought a 
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relative advantage, not greater influence, from the alliance relationship with the Soviet 
Union. The annexation of Inner Mongolia signaled the potential threat of losing 
independence again, thus Mongolia placed an absolute belief on the Soviet Union. The 
PRC’s brutal action against Tibet and the GPCR manifested the concern again and erased 
the hesitation. As a result, the Soviet Union dominated Mongolian politics and influenced 
all single decisions on political issues.  
The Soviet Union was the first country to recognize Mongolia in 1921. 
Besides some bilateral cooperation and assistance, the Soviets made little investment in 
Mongolia. However, the Soviet Union truly engaged with Mongolia and intensified its 
involvement after the split of Sino-Soviet relations in 1960s. The Soviet Union moved 
and stationed its troops in the vicinity of the Mongolian southern border, and 
substantially increased economic and military investment and grants. The Soviet Union 
was fully supportive when Mongolia launched an active campaign for UN membership. 
Under Soviet guidance, Mongolia strengthened its ties with Central and Eastern European 
Communist nations, and it became a de jure member of COMECON, de facto member of 
the Warsaw treaty, and a close ally of the Soviet Union following the signing of an 
Alliance Treaty in 1966.136 When Moscow and Beijing were on the verge of war in 1969, 
the Soviet forces in Mongolia stood at over 100,000 troops, whose arms included fixed 
and mobile intermediate ballistic missiles with nuclear and chemical warheads.137 During 
this period Brezhnev and a Soviet Defense minister had visited twice, which was the 
manifestation of the importance of Mongolia in the Sino-Soviet tension. Mongolia 
became a subject of the overall security and political process of the Soviet Union. It 
seemed that the Soviet Union was providing security for Mongolia based on the alliance 
treaty, but in truth, it wanted to secure Soviet interests in Mongolia and the Far East.  
Ravdan Bold highlights, “When the Soviets felt a threat to their security from China or 
elsewhere, they involved Mongolia in ‘fraternal all-round co-operation’ at the expense of 
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Mongolia’s own interests.  Soviet tactics of implementation of this policy were simple 
and were based on exploiting Mongolia’s traditional sensitivity towards China.”138 
Only after Gorbachev’s perestroika and the end of the Cold War, Mongolia 
finally had an opportunity to exercise an independent foreign policy. In 1990, Mongolia 
broke with the USSR, eliminated one-party rule, and embarked on a revolutionary path of 
political and economic liberalization. Mongolia declared a policy known as the “open 
door” in order to strengthen trade and economic ties with Japan, the United States, and 
Western Europe. Soon after adopting a new constitution, the democratic government of 
Mongolia also instituted privatization, financial reform, and trade liberalization.139 After 
the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops in Mongolia, the two countries’ relationship 
stagnated until the two countries signed a new treaty outlining friendly relations and 
cooperation in 1993. In the beginning of the 1990s, Russia had a domestic crisis and both 
countries were experiencing financial difficulties while both were under the difficult 
economic transition. Nevertheless, Mongolian government officials paid a visit to Russia 
to settle the Mongolian debt to the USSR and enhance bilateral relations, since Mongolia 
was largely dependent on Russia for petroleum products. Thankfully, the accrued debt 
issue was resolved between the two countries’ presidents in 2003, which was a great 
alleviation for Mongolia during the transition period.   
While the Mongolian-Russian relationship has been improving, Mongolia 
has paid special attention to avoid the old unilateral approach. By signing bilateral 
treaties with its two neighbors, Mongolia has begun urging the importance of third 
neighbors and regional and international institutions. Russia is still seeking dominance 
over the peripheries as its economic performance improves recently. Under former 
President (now prime minister) Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin put a new emphasis on old 
ties and sought to reassert influence where possible. The 25-point Ulaanbaatar 
Declaration signed between the two countries in late 2000 pledged to renew trade 
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relations and reaffirmed military ties.140 Putin’s recent visit was the manifestation of 
Russia’s reviving desire to spread its influence back, since Mongolia possesses natural 
resources including uranium.   
After agreeing to reach bilateral trade to one billion $U.S. annually during 
the Mongolian President Enkhbayar’s official visit to Moscow in May 2008,141 Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev paid official visit to Mongolia on the occasion of the 70th 
anniversary of the victory of  Halhin Gol in 2009. Additionally, Russia does not want the 
United States to have a strong presence or influence in Mongolia, because Russia and 
Mongolia’s relationship was improving a lot in last two decades. Certainly, Mongolia has 
been developing its foreign relations with various countries, but the relationship with the 
United States takes center stage due to the U.S. superpower status in the world today. 
Besides, Mongolia has been successfully introducing and developing democratic 
principles, and in contrast, Russia still lags behind on building democratic values. 
b. Economic Aspects 
During the Cold War, Mongolia’s economy was steered by the central 
party committee, and the centrally planning economic model was the fundament of the 
economy. Mongolia received a substantial amount of economic assistance from the 
Soviet Union and it was the backbone of the economic performance.  However, it was not 
free. Tumurchuluun states, “During the Soviet period Mongolia was a raw material 
supplier to the USSR.  The economies of the two countries became highly independent, 
albeit asymmetrically.142 Using the advantage of dominating Mongolia, the Soviet Union 
had received raw materials very cheap. That was the main claim Mongolians were using 
to deny the accumulated debt after the collapse of the USSR.    
Even after the Cold War, Russia still dominates in all the fields of 
Mongolia’s economy and is still the major provider of petroleum products for Mongolia. 
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Until recently, Russia provided 80 percent of Mongolia's petroleum products and a 
substantial amount of its electricity needs. That figure has been reduced due to oil 
imports from Kazakhstan, but Russian energy shipments to Mongolia remain vital. 
Mongolia’s main export products have been mineral resources, in particular copper, and 
Russia still buys most of the copper and molybdenum extracted and exploited by 
Mongolian companies.  The Russian government owns 49 percent of the Erdenet copper 
corporation, one of Mongolia’s premier enterprises. Furthermore, Russia has expressed 
its interest in investing in the big mining and industrial facilities in Mongolia and a 
number of Russian companies have been operating in Mongolia. Besides accepting the 
invitation to invest Mongolia’s largest coal reserve, Russia desires Mongolia’s uranium 
and gold reserves as well. Nevertheless, they are not alone—Chinese, Canadians, 
Japanese, and others are competing for the exposed riches. During a trip by then prime 
minister Sanjaagiin Bayar to Moscow in March 2008 and a return visit by Putin the 
following May, a deal was signed to jointly develop uranium projects, while Moscow 
also agreed to provide U.S.$300 million in agricultural aid and to develop a new railway 
system between the two states. These efforts saw bilateral trade reach U.S. $1.3 billion 
during 2008.143 While China dominates light industries and construction, Russia 
consolidates and tightens its grasp in the mining and heavy industry sectors. In other 
words, Russia is trying to regain its lost influence over the Mongolian economy and 
exploit its rich natural resources. 
c. Military Aspects 
The long stagnated military relationship has been resumed between 
Mongolia and the Russian Federation. Throughout the Cold War, the Mongolian Army 
became a part of the Soviet’s Far-Eastern front and substantially increased its military 
personnel and armaments. During the peak of the tension, Mongolia received a 
substantial amount of military equipment and weaponries. Military cooperation lasted 
through the 1970s, and at the end of the period Mongolia possessed a relatively large 
force with recent, if not up-to-date, equipment and weapons. Mongolia transformed and 
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built up primitive military forces into modern and mechanized forces. The Soviet Union 
provided all the equipment and weapons systems, but did not provide the most modern 
military arms and hardware.  Instead, it stationed military units with state-of-the-art 
weapon systems at the southern boundary of Mongolia. The vigilance of the two 
countries’ military was extremely high and bilateral exercises and strategic games took 
place almost year-round. The Soviets helped to build new units according to the security 
assessment. Since all the weapons and equipment were from the north, the Soviet assisted 
in maintaining this large Mongolian force. It appears that the Soviet Union was providing 
crucial security to Mongolia, but it was based on the importance of the Mongolian vast 
terrain standing between Moscow and Beijing, which could give a great advantage to a 
side who was controlling it.   
Everything changed, however, after the collapse of the Communist 
regime. Gorbachev first introduced the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Mongolia, 
which was a shock for Mongolians in the beginning. Nevertheless, it was a necessary 
measure to normalize relations with Mongolia’s two neighbors, with China in particular. 
The complete Soviet troop withdrawal finished in 1992. Along with various other 
difficulties, the economic hardship was enormous and it affected military as well. In the 
beginning of the 1990s, Mongolia downsized the military on several occasions, due to 
lack of resources to maintain it, and put a number of equipment and weaponries in long-
time conservation.   
After almost two decades of separation, Russian military resumed the 
close relationship with Mongolian armed forces. Though the two countries’ relationship 
normalized in 1993, the security cooperation remained inactive until recently. 
Nevertheless, the relationship has been changing and Russia wants to deepen the military 
tie. The main reason for the rapprochement was the Mongolian Armed forces’ improving 
relationship with the U.S. military and its active contribution to the international 
peacekeeping and multinational operations. For example, by sending its troops to the 
Iraqi operation, Mongolia attracted Russian and Chinese attention.   
High-ranking military officials reciprocally have visited each other and the 
relationship has noticeably improved during recent years. Chiefs of staff of Russian and 
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Mongolian visited each other annually and signed bilateral agreements for developing 
bilateral military cooperation. Twenty-seven years after the Soviet defense minister’s 
visit, Russian defense minister Anatolii Serdiukov paid an official visit to Mongolia 
accompanied by Army General N. E. Makarov and other high-ranking generals.144 
Dozens of Mongolian army officers attend training colleges in Russia each year, and the 
Mongolian armed forces also participate in joint exercises with the Russian military. In a 
major deal signed in April 2009, Russia agreed to provide U.S.$60 million in military aid 
to Mongolia, while also announcing plans to provide much-needed T-72 tanks, BTR-80 
armored personnel carriers, and helicopters to the Mongolian armed forces in exchange 
for meat supplies to Russian military bases in Siberia.145 Luvsanvandan Bold, Mongolian 
Defense Minister, paid an official visit to Russia in February 2010 and met with the 
Russian Defense Minister. The sides discussed state and prospects of military and 
military-technical bilateral cooperation, as well as security issues in Central Asia and 
Asia-Pacific region. Defense ministers took a favorable view of Darkhan-2, a Russo-
Mongolian military exercise (August–September 2009).146 During this exercise, Russian 
and Mongolian military personnel accomplished a tremendous amount of work 
renovating Mongolian army military equipment and technology. 
d. Conclusion 
Like China, Russia wants its influence over Mongolia—especially after 
recent discoveries of large mineral resources and the Chinese blooming interest over 
them. However, Russia still lags behind China on the economic development. Russia has 
been eager to regain the control it lost with the disintegration of the Soviet Empire. 
Nevertheless, Russia is the greatest potential balancer against Chinese hostility, though it 
is unlikely. In certain economic fields, Russia cannot compete with China over Mongolia, 
but it still shares the large portion of mining and heavy industry sectors in Mongolia. 
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Russian high-ranking officials’ recent visits manifest its ambition to retain its share, 
while Mongolia attempts to cooperate with a third country to exploit Oyutolgoi, one of 
the largest copper reserves in the world. Though long-time fraternal relations were halted 
for a certain period of time, Moscow and Beijing are assiduously working to invigorate 
the cooperation with Mongolia, particularly Russia. The major sources of Russia to 
influence Mongolia are the Russian export of petroleum products and its shares in a 
various mining and other economic sectors. Mongolia lacks refinery and processing 
capability, though it has some unproven deposits of oil, so Russia provides the majority 
of Mongolia’s petroleum products. While it provides a reasonable price for petroleum 
products, any time Russia could limit or restrain the export in order to pressure 
Mongolian decision making. Tumurchuluun projected in 1995, “This passive and even 
neglectful Russian attitude toward Mongolia will not last. The first reason is that 
historically Russia—regardless of whether it was the Tsarist government or the Soviets—
has always sought to strengthen its position in Mongolia; it is naïve to believe that Russia 
would abandon Mongolia.”147 Some people argue that Mongolia possesses no importance 
in Russian policy, especially in providing security. However, Mongolia is still of great 
importance to Russia and its importance is rising. Russia encounters illegal Chinese 
immigrants’ problem in the Far East, which definitely underscores Mongolia’s strategic 
significance.  Tsedendamba Batbayar highlights:  
Because of its location between Russia and China, today, as in the past, 
Mongolia is likely to be of strategic importance to Russia and to China. 
Mostly owing to its own weakened position, Moscow is likely to favor 
Mongolia’s adopting a neutral posture vis-à-vis its two neighbors. In this 
way, Russia would continue to underline the strategic importance of 
Mongolia and use every opportunity to strengthen its position there.148 
Therefore, Russia, after a period of recession is trying to restore the old 
prestige in neighboring countries, and it underlines Mongolia, who has been successfully 
reforming its economic and political institutions according to the democratic principles.  
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In addition, Mongolia’s attempt to build compact, efficient, and professional military 
forces with the assistance of western powers, particularly with the United States, and its 
active contribution to the international peace support operation undoubtedly raise 
concerns between Russian elites.  Therefore, even though the relationship between Russia 
and Mongolia seems to be improving, economic constraints and old Soviet legacy 
prevents it from developing further.    
3. Mongolia-United States Relationship 
Soviet leadership under Gorbachev pursued a more rational policy than the 
previous leaders that was broadening Soviet relations beyond Communist states. With the 
improvement of Sino-Russian relations in the end of the 1980s and Gorbachev’s clear 
indication to withdraw Soviet troops, Mongolia faced a security dilemma. Lacking the 
Soviet security umbrella seemed the great doom for small, landlocked Mongolia. 
Therefore, Mongolia effectively began to initiate direct negotiations with the United 
States, and during the Soviet foreign minister’s visit to Ulaanbaatar in January 1986, 
Mongolia acquired the approval to establish diplomatic relations with the United States.  
Mongolia did so in January 1987.149 Since then the United States has been playing an 
important role in Mongolian foreign relations and is considered the greatest potential 
third neighbor who could balance Moscow and Beijing’s influence. After the demise of 
the Soviet Union, the United States stayed the only superpower with power projection 
capability to influence any part of the world. The United States established and opened its 
embassy in 1988, and Mongolia accredited its first ambassador to the United States in 
1989. 
a. Political Aspects 
Since the very beginning, democracy has been a main impetus or incentive 
to intensify and strengthen the U.S.–Mongolian relationship. When the ruling party of the 
Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) resigned under the pressure of the democratic 
movement forces, there were disputes over domestic policy. However, all competing 
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parties reached consensus on the open door foreign policy. Tom Ginsburg notes, “The 
basic consensus statement committed the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party 
(MPRP) to attract foreign investment, to expand relations with the West and with Asia, to 
implement a non-aligned, nuclear-free policy, and to prohibit the stationing of foreign 
troops on Mongolian soil.”150 Among the relations with the Western countries, the 
relationship with the United States has been significant due to the U.S. prominence in the 
contemporary world politics. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the political vacuum 
was created in the Mongolian plateau, so Mongolians were working hard to fill it. 
Therefore, in order to break the previous isolation from the rest of the world, except East 
European Communist regimes, Mongolian leaders established relations with the United 
States, Japan, and Western Europe. President Ochirbat’s visit to Washington in 1991 was 
the first high-level visit by a Mongolian President. The very first bilateral documents 
include an agreement on cooperation in cultural and education affairs, signed in 1989, 
and MPR and the United States signed in 1990 on a Consular convention between the 
two countries.   
Among the donor nations, the United States paid special attention to the 
economic difficulties experienced by Mongolia in the beginning of the 1990s. Batbayar 
highlights, “In January 1991, President Bush requested the congress to grant Mongolia 
most-favored nation status and in March the Congress passed its resolution for 
Mongolia’s support of the movement for democracy. The U.S. Secretary of State, James 
Baker, visited Mongolia twice (1990 and 1991) and urged other countries, including 
Japan, to join the broad-based world community support for Mongolia.”151 Since then, 
the United States has been a significant provider of aid and development assistance to 
Mongolia. While supporting Mongolian democracy and encouraging a free market 
system, the United States provides various assistance from different sources including 
security cooperation. Though the United States evaded false expectations about a United 
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States de facto relationship, U.S. Secretary of State Albright, during her May 1998 visit, 
reaffirmed America’s assurance to sustain close cooperation in various spheres with 
Mongolia.152 Certainly, the U.S. support was significant to Mongolia, when it was 
admitted to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB).   
Due to the most important national goal of developing the domestic 
economy, Mongolia’s dominant force in its international relations became economic 
aspects. It was the major topic of Mongolia and the United States relations initially. 
Nonetheless, the United States has also given political support. Tumurchuluun 
underscores, 
A good example of this from the point of view of Mongolia’s national 
security was the following statement of support by the Government of the 
United States: ‘If Mongolia ever faces a threat and decides to refer the 
matter to the United Nations Security Council, the United States, along 
with other members of the Security Council, would consider appropriate 
steps to be taken.153  
The view of Mongolian Foreign Minister Erdenechuluun notes that in 
terms of Mongolia’s third neighbor policy, Japan and Germany have been playing an 
instrumental role in alleviating economic and social hardship. To many Mongolian 
politicians and government officials, the United States would appear as the savior of new 
Mongolia and the “major pillar” of its national security.154   
The relationship between Mongolia and the United States has continued to 
grow significantly and high-level officials’ visits have become regular. Mongolian Prime 
Minister Enkhbayar visited Washington in November 2001. A significant turning point of 
the relations, however, was the Mongolian government’s decision to take part in the 
multinational coalition in Operation Iraqi Freedom. This decision boosted Mongolia’s 
stature in the global community and intensified Mongolian–U.S. relations. A Mongolian 
contingent in Iraq was the main reason for the first visit of an American president to 
                                                 
152 Cossa, “Assuring Mongolia’s Independence,” 16. 
153 Tumurchuluun, “Mongolia’s Foreign Policy Revisited,” 286. 
154 Batbayar, “Geopolitics and Mongolia’s Search for Post-Soviet Identity,” 333. 
 70
Mongolia in 2005. Since the Mongolian troop contribution to Iraq, many dignitaries have 
reciprocally visited. President Bagabandi came to Washington for a meeting with 
President George W. Bush in July 2004. President Bush, Mrs. Bush, and Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice visited Mongolia in November 2005 and signed the bilateral 
agreement and cooperation. Mongolian President Enkhbayar visited the White House in 
October 2007 and the two presidents signed the Millennium Challenge Compact for 
Mongolia. 
b. Economic Aspects 
The United States has been a major force to develop the Mongolian 
economy during and after the transitional period. Main economic relations between the 
two countries are mostly U.S. assistance programs, besides small, bilateral trade. In 1991, 
a trade agreement between the government of MPR and the government of the United 
States, and in 1994, the bilateral investment treaty were signed. The U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) plays a leading role in providing bilateral 
development assistance to Mongolia. The program emphasizes two major themes: 
sustainable, private sector-led economic growth and more effective and accountable 
governance. Total USAID assistance to Mongolia from 1991 through 2009 was about 
$190 million, all in grant form. In the area of economic growth, USAID Mongolia's FY 
2009 budget of $7.5 million was to focus on economic and trade policy, energy sector 
reform, and national consensus building, with a special emphasis on stabilizing the 
banking sector and building national consensus on the future of the mining sector.155 In 
other words, Mongolia heavily relies on the leading role of the United States since it has 
lost its patronage relations with the Soviet Union. In all branches of government, or even 
in nongovernmental sectors, anyone can see a noticeable trend to learn from Western 
countries, especially the United States.   
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The following paragraph illustrates how broadly Washington extends its 
grant to Mongolia, which covers various agencies and sectors, and its intention to 
intensify the bilateral relations: 
USAID funding in 2009 was to support anti-corruption work and help 
improve the ability of the judiciary to adjudicate commercial cases. In 
January 2010, through USAID the United States signed an agreement to 
contribute $10 million in grant money to assist the people of Mongolia in 
recovering from the negative effects of the global financial crisis. 
Provided by the FY 2009 global financial crisis supplemental, the U.S. 
assistance will help the government meet its deficit reduction targets while 
maintaining essential social safety net transfers to those hardest hit by the 
economic crisis. Additional funds also support technical advisors at 
Mongolia's central bank. Both the budget support and technical assistance 
are designed the complement the IMF's continuing Stand-By Arrangement 
with Mongolia.156 
Washington’s approval for Most Favorite Nation (MFN) status gave 
Mongolia quota-free access to the U.S. textile market. Several Mongolian firms, 
particularly cashmere and leather factories, have been exporting their products to 
parts of the United States. Recently, Mongolia began the export of world-class 
vodka to the United States and other countries. At the same time, American firms 
invested in certain economic sectors, such as oil research and exploitation, heavy 
equipment, cashmere, and tourism. In 2004, a Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement between Mongolia and the United States was signed during the 
Mongolian President Bagabandi’s visit to Washington. Despite the geographic 
distance, bilateral trade has folded several times since 1991. In 2003, the bilateral 
trade between Mongolia and the United States reached $162 million. U.S. firms 
had invested $36 million into Mongolia, consisting of four percent of the total 
investment in Mongolia. Mongolia has been enjoying U.S. support of providing 
favorable conditions for Mongolian firms. 
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c. Military Aspects 
Ulaanbaatar and Washington have improved dramatically military-to-
military relations since the beginning of diplomatic relations. Mongolia’s aspiration of 
providing security for its vast terrain after the Soviet troop withdrawal shaped the 
military cooperation with the remaining sole superpower. With the absence of Soviet 
military assistance, Mongolia could not maintain the large force that it used to have 
during the Cold War. Therefore, the Mongolian government greatly downsized the armed 
forces and openly expressed its intention to reform and to modernize its military.  
Additionally the military leaders were aware of the backwardness of its military 
technology and equipment. Mongolia’s main intention was to build a compact, efficient, 
and professional military. Therefore, the basis of the United States and Mongolian 
military-to-military relations were to assist Mongolia with its improvements in military 
professionalization and to improve its peacekeeping capability.   
Mongolia and the United States exchanged military attaché in 1991. In 
1996, Washington and Ulaanbaatar signed an agreement on military exchanges and visits 
between the two countries. Starting in 1982, Washington started to provide specialized 
military training and education to Mongolia military personnel through the International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) program.157 The frequency of the reciprocating 
defense officials’ visit has been increasing and the Department of Defense (DD) has 
launched various programs to support Mongolian defense reform and to increase capacity 
of Mongolia's armed forces to participate in international peacekeeping operations. A 
series of seminars and conferences were organized in Mongolia and in the United States 
on various reforming subjects, such as reforming defense planning and budgeting 
systems, defense resource management, and defense management.   
Mongolia contributed small numbers of troops to coalition operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan beginning in 2003, gaining experience that enabled it to deploy 
armed peacekeepers to both UN and NATO peacekeeping missions. As discussed earlier, 
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the decision to send troops was the turning point of the relations. In order to support 
Mongolia’s aim to enhance military relations and to keep its continuous support in the 
Global War on Terrorism, in 2004, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, and in 2005, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Mongolia. During both 
meetings the two sides agreed to expand bilateral relations, enhance the U.S. security 
assistance program, and increase the number of Mongolian military personnel studying in 
U.S. military schools. With U.S. Department of Defense assistance and cooperation, 
Mongolia and the United States have jointly hosted "Khan Quest," the Asian region's 
premier annual peacekeeping exercise since 2006. The number of participants has grown 
each year, with the Republic of Korea joining for the first time in 2009.158   
When Mongolia withdrew its troops from Iraq after contributing ten 
rotations, Mongolia and the United States began the Bilateral Consultative Council 
(BCC). At the meeting in the United States, Mongolia agreed to send company-size 
troops to Afghanistan. In addition to these troops, Mongolia also deployed a Mobile 
Training Team to Afghanistan to support the training of the Afghan National Army.  
Besides the coalition operations, Mongolian soldiers have been participating in 
peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leon since 2005, and Mongolia sent its first 800-man 
peacekeeping battalion to Chad in late 2009. When manning and equipping soldiers for 
peacekeeping operations, Mongolia has used U.S. military assistance to provide proper 
gear for the individuals. Besides personnel gear, the United States has provided 
technological assistance, such as providing field medical and hygiene equipment, optics, 
night visions, and ballistic vests and helmets. 
d. Conclusion 
Mongolia became the first Asian Communist state that changed the 
political system and made the peaceful transition from centrally planning Communism to 
a market-oriented democracy. Since China remains as a socialist country and Russia still 
struggles to depart from post-Soviet hardships and regain superpower status, Mongolia 
needs a third partner to counter-balance them. Friendly United States and Mongolian 
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relations have some advantages over Mongolia’s relations with Beijing and Moscow 
because the United States takes the leading role in global peace, economy, and security.  
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the United 
States assisted to shape Mongolian independent policy over the pressure from Moscow 
and Beijing. Additionally, the U.S. attitude toward Mongolia’s political and economic 
change has greatly influenced the level of participation from other developed countries, 
particularly Japan. The main incentive of the good relations has been democratic values.  
Additionally, Mongolia and the United States have the same views on most issues and do 
not have a negative past legacy and national objectives.  
The United States gave an MFN status to Mongolia and quote-free access 
to the U.S. market for Mongolian firms. During the difficult transition period in 
Mongolia, when economic growth was unimaginable, the United States offered 
significant grants. This aid helped the Mongolian people to overcome difficulties, and 
still the United States is implementing a variety of projects today. Another aspect that 
truly consolidated Mongolian–U.S. relations was successful military cooperation. 
Particularly, Mongolia’s decision to join the coalition in Iraq absolutely altered the 
relations in all fields. Nevertheless, even before this decision, the U.S. military was 
deeply involved in the Mongolian Armed Forces’ transformation and modernization 
process and assisted with building a professional military capable of performing 
unconventional duties, such as peacekeeping missions. Many officers and NCOs studied 
and participated in U.S. military schools and field training exercises and seminars. With 
the assistance of the United States military, Mongolia facilitated the military 
transformation and its doctrine and managed to send hundreds of peacekeepers abroad. 
Mongolian Armed Forces today are much smaller, but more professionally oriented and 
capable of executing multilateral tasks and missions. While military ties between the 
United States and Mongolia has deepened, it did not replace old Soviet-Mongolian 
military relations. Furthermore, the improving military cooperation affected other sectors 
and became the main reason of an American president’s historical visit to Mongolia in 
2005. In general, Mongolia and the United States both enjoy good bilateral relations with 
mutual understanding. 
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4. Mongolian-Japanese Relationship 
Japan has been a generous friend of Mongolia since the end of the bipolar system.  
Mongolia and Japan established diplomatic relations in 1972. Japan assisted Mongolia in 
1977 to build the first cashmere factory. Then the relations between Japan and Mongolia 
were stagnant until the end of the Soviet regime. Japan was the first country to offer 
assistance during the economic transition period in Mongolia after 1990, and, with the 
United States, encouraged other developed nations to provide assistance for its 
democratic reform and economic development. 
a. Political Aspects 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, there was not a wide 
variety of interactions between Japan and Mongolia, except little, unofficial cultural 
exchanges. However, after the democratic movement and peaceful political transition, 
Mongolian-Japanese relations have been developing significantly. In February 1990, 
Mongolian Prime Minister D. Sodnom visited Japan, and the two countries signed a trade 
agreement. In addition, Japan granted Mongolia the MFN status, enabling it to promote 
its trade within a convertible currency area. Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu 
visited Mongolia in 1991 and pledged to give $15 million of economic aid. Additionally, 
with Tokyo’s initiative, an international conference on aid to Mongolia was co-sponsored 
by Japan and the World Bank (WB) and held in Tokyo in 1991. Delegations from 
fourteen countries, including the United States and Germany, and four international 
institutions, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), IMF, and ADB, 
took part in the conference, and it created a great opportunity for Mongolia by attracting 
international attention. Batbayar writes, “The August 1991 visit of Toshiki Kaifu, Prime 
Minister of Japan, was the first visit to Mongolia by a leader of leading industrialized 
democracies, demonstrating the Japanese government’s strong commitment to 
Mongolia’s newly born democracy and its market transition.”159 The participating 
organizations and states supported Mongolia’s willingness to develop a democratic 
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society and pledged $150 million of aid.  Japan’s share in this pledge equaled $55 
million.  Until 1997, Japan jointly organized six other Mongolia support group meetings 
with the WB. The seventh meeting was held in Mongolia and the number of participating 
countries and organizations increased dramatically from past meetings.   
Since these meetings, Mongolia has attempted to develop a comprehensive 
partnership with Japan. The manifestation of this policy was “The Joint Statement on 
Friendship and Cooperation,” which was signed during the Mongolian president’s visit to 
Tokyo in 1998. Further solidification of the relationship between Japan and Mongolia 
was the second visit by a Prime Minister of Japan in 1999. During this visit, Prime 
Minister Keizo Obuchi presented a new $60 million official development assistance 
(ODA) loan to finance the rehabilitation of a thermo-electric power plant along with 
other economic and technical assistance offerings.160 Obuchi pointed to this visit as the 
beginning a new stage of bilateral relations based on shared values of freedom and 
democracy and reiterated Japan’s active support of Mongolia’s effort in reform and 
renovation.161 
Japan and Mongolia’s officials have been reciprocating each other’s visits. 
For example, in 2003 and 2007 a Mongolian president visited Japan and signed bilateral 
agreements. H. I. H. Prince and Princess Akishino first visited Mongolia and it was a 
very special moment for the two countries’ relations because royal family in Japan is 
considered the most respectful part of Japanese culture. During the last decade, a 
Mongolian prime minister visited Tokyo four times, while Japanese Prime Minister 
Koizumi visited Mongolia in 2006. During Mongolian President Enkhbayar’s visit in 
2007 the two sides formulated the "Basic Action Plan for Japan and Mongolia over the 
Next Ten Years," and agreed to establish a “Public and private joint consultative 
meeting,” which convenes every two years.162 In the same year, on the occasion of the 
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35th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and 
Mongolia, Japanese crowned prince Naruhito visited Mongolia and attended the 
celebration activities. Based on the mutual understanding of the democratic principles, 
Japanese and Mongolian diplomatic relations have been developing greatly during the 
last two decades. 
b. Economic Aspects 
Many Mongolian analysts claim that Japan has been the most generous 
friend of Mongolia, and it is true in terms of economic assistance. Initially, the economic 
cooperation between the two countries was principally in the form of humanitarian aid 
for the Mongolian people, who were fighting economic deterioration in Mongolia during 
the economic transition toward democracy. Gradually, however, as Mongolian economics 
improved, the cooperation mostly focused on the development of infrastructure to assist 
Mongolia in gaining economic self-sufficiency. Japan considers Mongolia a potential 
area of influence based on the location of the country. Moreover, as the third biggest 
uranium consumer in the world, Japan is particularly interested in Mongolia’s uranium 
deposit. However, Japanese willingness for close cooperation is overwhelmed by Russia 
and China. Both neighbors are displeased with the deepening of Japan-Mongolia 
relations, due to Japans closest-ally status with the United States and the negative legacy 
of the Japanese atrocities during WWII.   
As mentioned earlier, Japan has provided a significant amount of 
assistance and loans to Mongolia since 1990. Japan’s economic assistance to Mongolia 
on the government level consists of three main schemes: grants, ODA loans, and 
technical cooperation.163 According to some official statistics, Japanese assistance 
equaled 131 billion yen from 1991 to 2004, and it is considered seventy percent of the 
total foreign assistance to Mongolia.164 Nevertheless, the two countries’ trade has been 
far below than China and Russia’s shares in Mongolian trade, and Mongolia’s export to 
Japan equals less than one percent of Japanese import. Six percent of Mongolia’s imports 
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come from Japan, which is relatively smaller than Russia and China’s shares. Japan and 
Mongolia’s bilateral trade was limited due to Moscow and Beijing’s dominance in 
foreign trade and geographical distance. Additionally, democratic principles also play an 
important role in broadening the relationship between Mongolia and Japan, but have 
become the major reason for Russian and Chinese suspicion. During the visit of the 
chairman of Mongolian parliament to Japan in 2007, the two countries signed the ODA 
loan project to build a new airport in Mongolia, which costs approximately 28.8 billion 
yen. 
c. Cultural Exchange 
Japan and Mongolia’s military relations are limited to the military 
officials’ visits and the few Mongolian cadets who are studying in Japanese military 
academies. Meanwhile, people-to-people relations have been developing enormously. 
When Mongolian wrestlers entered the Japanese traditional sport of sumo and started to 
succeed, understanding the two cultures between Japanese and Mongolian people has 
become an important subject. The Mongolian sumo wrestlers’ performance has become 
an important topic within the traditional Japanese culture. Mongolians are naturally good 
wrestlers, and this nature helps them bear the hardships they have faced during the 
extremely harsh sumo training. Therefore, the two Mongolian sumo wrestlers earned the 
highest title in professional sumo wrestling and have become a big phenomenon in Japan. 
Mongolians acquired better knowledge of Japanese traditions, while Japanese people 
have a chance to see Mongolian life through their sumo wrestlers. In other words, 
Mongolian sumo wrestlers have become a bridge between the two countries and are 
confirming already established, friendly relations. 
5. Conclusion 
Mongolia has only two neighbors and they are huge. Landlocked between these 
large and nuclear powers leaves Mongolia few possibilities of providing security. 
However, the geographic location has both negative and positive sides. Its geography 
locks Mongolia within Moscow and Beijing’s spheres of influence and Mongolia lacks 
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freedom of movement. Nonetheless, Mongolia’s geography also protects the country 
from possible hostility from other powers or regional crime groups. Russia and China 
cannot be compared with Mongolia geographically, though Mongolia is the nineteenth 
largest country in the world. Demographically and by military force, Mongolia’s two 
neighbors dwarf the small country. Economically, Mongolia is largely dependent on 
Moscow and Beijing for petroleum products, commodities, and food items. Particularly, 
China has the second largest economy in the world and a very cheap labor force with 
pursuit of reliable and cheap energy source everywhere. China’s economic achievement 
combined with its growing stature has become a looming threat to Mongolia, as China 
could easily absorb Mongolia’s small and developing economy.   
Mongolia needs a smart foreign policy; otherwise Moscow and Beijing would 
easily ignore the fate of this small nation and assimilate it. In particular, China could 
claim some areas and one analyst notes, “some Mongolians fear that the disputed 
territories are still regarded by the Chinese elites as Chinese land.”165 History suggests 
that Russia and China have been playing a trump card, apparently ignoring Mongolia’s 
point of view.   
Therefore, the small state of Mongolia pursues independent foreign policy with 
nonaligned and neutral characteristics. Unfortunately, it is not enough for the unique case 
of Mongolia. According to realist theory, large and powerful neighbors would dominate 
over Mongolia’s independent policy and interests. Nonetheless, there is a way. The most 
applicable international theory for Mongolia might be balancing with strong third 
neighbors (possibly with international organizations) against Moscow and Beijing. In 
order to accomplish this task Mongolia should continue to preserve regional and 
international peace and stability and improve its stature within the global community.   
Certainly, Moscow and Beijing have special interests in gaining control over the 
small state between them, which has vast open land with various natural resources, but is 
scarcely inhabited. Absence of manpower, investment, technology, and hardware leads 
Mongolia to rarely heavily on foreign direct investment. Though Mongolia focuses on 
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multilateral approaches in political and economic policy, Russia and China restrain this 
attempt. Furthermore, Russia and China would like to control Mongolia’s independent 
policy as they have in the past. While Russia does not truly engage in this action because 
of the onset of the economic recovery, China has a true intention to influence Mongolia 
both politically and economically.   
Due to globalization, economic systems have become interrelated. However, a 
small economy such as Mongolia cannot turn into an effective participant of economic 
globalization. In contrast, China’s economy has been growing by a double-digit rate for 
the last two decades, and it has become a global hub for production. While other 
countries’ economies do not depended on Mongolia’s economy, the Chinese economy 
has closely associated with the leading economies, and many countries, including the 
United States, are becoming heavily dependent for commodities on China. Therefore, if 
this trend continues, Mongolia will become a supplier of raw materials for China’s 
enormous and growing economy. The impossibility of providing cheap labor will 
exacerbate the effort to produce final products, which could compete in the globalizing 
world economy. China will protect its special interests in the peripheries. According to 
various Chinese officials and intellectuals’ speeches, Chinese military has new tasks, 
which include the protection of Chinese growing economic and other interests abroad. 
Certainly, for this purpose, energy hungry China occupies and secures reefs in the South 
China Sea claimed by other nations in the region, such as Philippine and Vietnam, and 
built some permanent structures. Some of these structures were upgraded into a military 
fortress.166 
China is continuously blaming the United States for pursuing hegemonic policy in 
Asia.  Therefore, Mongolia’s third neighbor policy apparently contradicts with Chinese 
regional power ambition and its aspiration to control its peripheries.  The United States 
and Mongolia share the desire of building a democratic and stable society in East Asia, 
which could enhance the stability of the entire region.  China does not want the United 
States and Mongolia military-to-military relations to develop further.  Additionally, 
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Japan’s generous treatment of the newly established, democratic state of Mongolia and 
the growing bilateral relations truly provoke Chinese dissent. China still opposes Japan’s 
rearmament and its ascension in the regional and international arenas, and Chinese 
nationalism has been a major cause of the lingering anti-Japanese sentiment. In truth, two 
countries are competing in the regional politics and economic development, so both sides 
do not want each other to enhance the influence in the region. In particular, China really 
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IV. POLICY ANALYSIS 
Mongolia enjoys friendly relations with every country in the region. The Concept 
of Foreign Relations highlights the cornerstone of Mongolia’s foreign policy relations 
with Moscow and Beijing. The relations with both neighbors are peaceful and friendly.  
However, no one knows whether this tranquility will last. Historically, Russia and China 
had been rivals and allies, and when they antagonized each other Mongolia had to make 
tough decisions. Mongolia is currently pursuing an independent foreign policy and takes 
measures to defend it. For this reason, Ravdan Bold states that it is necessary to defend 
the home country despite the size of the population, military, and stature.   
The Concept notes the second priority of the foreign policy as seeking friendly 
relations with developed Western and Asian nations, such as the United States, Japan, 
and Germany. Mongolia’s “third neighbor” policy stems from this notion. As noted in 
previous chapters, Mongolia is seeking and developing good relations with these nations. 
The main objective has been to balance against the pressure from Mongolia’s immediate 
neighbors. Cossa highlights, “Maintaining close, constructive relations with its neighbors 
and other close friends is another means of preserving Mongolia’s independence. From a 
security standpoint, relations with China and Russia loom largest, given their close 
proximity and the fact that both have a history of dominance over Mongolia. A policy 
that preserves good relations with both neighbors without tilting toward either seems the 
wisest.”167 
According to further writings in the Concept, multilateralism takes a respectful 
place in the context. Mongolia is adopting the policy of developing relations with other 
nations and international and regional organizations as well. In order to implement this 
policy Mongolia is attempting to enhance its international stature by various means, 
including effective participation in international peacekeeping operations.   
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This chapter discusses the Mongolian policies after the Cold War and assesses the 
best choices for Mongolia. Additionally, it briefly discusses military aspects that would 
support the national policy.  
A. POLICY OPTIONS AND CHOICES 
Mongolia’s policy after the demise of the Soviet sphere of influence has been 
independent, but non-aligned and neutral to its immediate neighbors. This neutral 
characteristic stems from Mongolia’s geostrategic location, sandwiched between two 
large powers, and from historical bandwagoning with each of them. Mongolian 
sovereignty has been based on the balance of power between Moscow and Beijing. When 
this balance was lost, Mongolia’s independence was jeopardized, and either Moscow or 
Beijing destroyed Mongolia’s sovereignty and annexed it. Therefore, Mongolia’s 
foremost goal has been to implement foreign policy to preserve and consolidate this 
balance of power. If Mongolia complies with one side, it provides geostrategic advantage 
to one of the two neighbors. Because Russia and China are big countries, they might have 
different interests in various issues, if not contradicted. History has seen both competition 
and collaboration among China and Russia. Because of this reason, the Concept of 
Mongolia Foreign Relations clearly defines that the relations with Mongolia’s two 
neighbors are its first priority.   
During Soviet dominance in the politics of Mongolia, however, the bandwagoning 
and balancing approach dominated. Maintaining and strengthening the alliance with the 
Soviet Union was an important aspect of Mongolia’s foreign policy. Mongolia was 
largely economically dependent on the Soviets, and Mongolia’s foreign policy was the 
tutelage of the USSR. However, the end of the Cold War enabled Mongolia to pursue 
independent foreign policy. Multilateralism, a third neighbor search, and active 
contribution to regional and global peace and security are paralleled with the non-aligned 
and neutral policy toward Moscow and Beijing. Affiliations with international finance 
organizations and attempts to attract a donor community and foreign investment have 
become common practices in Mongolia’s policy.   
As a result, the international community now sees Mongolia with friendly 
relations with a number of countries while rationally managing good neighborly relations 
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with its large neighbors, effectively searching for third neighbors, and actively 
contributing to the preservation of international peace and stability.   
1. Multilateral Approach 
Multilateralism is Mongolia’s major strategy to guarantee national security and 
economic development. Mongolia’s Concept of Foreign Policy states that “in formulating 
Mongolia’s foreign policy and determining its priority directions and objectives, a 
flexible approach shall be applied, paying close attention to the development of 
international relations and to the regional and world political situation.”168 This quote 
clearly expresses Mongolia’s desire to implement the multilateral foreign policy.   
Though Mongolia’s foreign policy priority goes to the immediate neighbors, it 
truly maintains good relations with most of the nations in the region, including North 
Korea. Mongolia has bilateral relations with more than 140 countries in the world. It is 
the only state in the region that does not have territorial and political disputes with other 
countries. Mongolia has joined more than 140 international and diplomatic agreements 
and has signed numerous bilateral agreements with a number of countries. For instance, 
Mongolia signed the “Strategic Partnership” agreements with Japan, Turkey, South 
Korea, Russia, China, Canada, and Germany from 1997 to 2008.169 The outcome of 
Mongolia’s multi-polar, open, and independent foreign policy becomes a variety of new 
and friendly partners in the regional and international arenas. These new partners support 
Mongolia’s transition toward democratic society and guarantee its survival in this fast-
changing and globalizing world.   
Mongolia joins various regional and international organizations and movements 
to express its voice and develop multilateral policy. For example, it is a common practice 
that small states pursue a neutral policy or join the Non-Aligned Movements (NAM). 
However, conducting a neutral policy or joining the NAM is not a perfect choice for 
Mongolia. On the contrary, it has been a political tool designed for self-defense. The 
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alternative ways to pursue a neutral policy are supporting neither side, staying away from 
disputes between other actors, and maintaining a flexible posture.170 Other examples of 
Mongolia joining other organizations are discussed in the following chapters. The 
Concept Mongolian Foreign Policy highlights in the article 9: 
In its foreign policy Mongolia shall uphold peace, strive to avoid 
confrontation with other countries, and pursue a multi-base policy. While 
always championing its national interests, it will at the same time respect 
the legitimate interests of other countries and its partners. Mongolia will 
not interfere in the disputes between its two neighboring countries unless 
the disputes affect Mongolia’s national interest. It shall pursue a policy of 
refraining from joining any military alliance or grouping, allowing the use 
of its territory or air space against any other country, and the stationing or 
foreign troops or weapons, including nuclear or any other type of mass 
destruction weapons in its territory.171 
In addition to this clear policy toward its two neighbors, Mongolia had concluded 
ten more bilateral treaties on security issues both with China and with Russia, besides the 
Treaty of Friendly Relations and Cooperation between Mongolia and Russia (concluded 
1993) and Mongolia and China (1994).172 Mongolia has pledged to respect the 
sovereignty of its neighbors and not to interfere in their internal affairs. A corollary to 
this pledge is Mongolia has no interest in or intention of using Mongolian ethnic issues, 
since both Russia and China have ethnic Mongol populations.173 The main idea here is 
that Mongolia does not limit its relations only with Moscow and Beijing and definitely 
wants a variety of countries’ interest and support. Mongolian desire is not to be 
constrained by a certain paradigm for its foreign policy, especially in providing security.  
Truly, Mongolians want different opinions beyond China and Russia due to the historic 
lessons. One policy option after the end the Cold War has been Mongolia’s persistent 
search for a third neighbor in order to provide security. This policy option is assessed in 
the following chapter. 
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2. Third Neighbor Search   
A huge aspect of providing security for Mongolia is searching for a third 
neighbor, while pursuing a friendly policy toward its two neighbors. Mongolia vividly 
stated in its foreign policy concept that the priority focus will be on its two neighbors and 
the second focus will be to promote friendly relations with highly developed countries, 
such as the United States, Japan, and Germany.174 Mongolian authors generally agree 
that because of the lack of necessary political and economic weight to implement its 
declared national security policy, Mongolia needs a strong third power as a 
counterweight to balance its relations with the immediate neighbors.175 
As Bold states, maintaining bilateral relations between Mongolia and the United 
States is essential for Mongolia. Due to multiple centers of power in Asia, there will be 
little likelihood that any single state will dominate the regional politics. From Mongolia’s 
point of view, maintaining a stable but not-too-close triangular relationship between the 
United States, Russia, and China is very important because confrontation and competition 
among these powers will reduce Mongolia’s freedom of movement.176 Bold makes the 
following statement: 
Friendly Mongol-American relations give Mongolia a greater sense of 
security and more confidence in the success of its reforms.  Both Russia 
and China still play a critical role in Mongolia’s affairs, but it becomes 
increasingly clear that the ability of both neighbors to alter Mongolia’s 
relations with the outside world is diminishing.177 
As the relationship between the United States and Mongolia deepens (cooperation 
between the two militaries has been developed very well in recent years), Russia and 
China enhance their awareness, and more frequent visits and bilateral agreements have 
been concluded lately. In November 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush visited 
Mongolia. He was the first U.S. president to visit Mongolia, and it aroused a wave of 
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excitement in Mongolia and a wave of suspicion in its neighbors.178 The two countries’ 
presidents signed a joint statement and it reaffirmed the longstanding friendship between 
the United States of America and Mongolia and committed the two countries to define 
guiding principles and expand the framework of the comprehensive partnership between 
their two democratic countries based on shared values and common strategic interests.179  
The main implication of this concept is that the destiny, security, and development of 
Mongolia do not depend only on its two neighbors, but also would like involvement of 
powerful states’ strategic interest, involvement and influence. Therefore, the concept of a 
third neighbor is a political perception based on military and strategy that stems from the 
diplomatic policy of seeking a third partner when a small country with difficult 
geography is pressured by large neighbors.   
Japan welcomed Mongolia’s search for a third neighbor to deepen its relations 
and counter-balance against its two neighbors. Mongolia’s Foreign Minister 
Erdenechuluun has the following views: 
Trying to reduce the possibility of an unpredictable turn of events that 
might affect their existence and security, small and weak countries have 
often turned to third parties so as to balance their relations with immediate 
neighbors. Whereas this has been true for Mongolia in principle, a single 
regional player able to outweigh Russia and China can simply not be 
conceived of in the foreseeable future. One might therefore not think of 
this neighbor in terms of a single country, but rather as a group of 
countries, especially those which have consistently supported democratic 
change in Mongolia. In this respect, special attention should be paid to the 
role played by Japan (the biggest donor), whose active and all round 
involvement in the country’s difficult transition has been instrumental in 
alleviating present economic and social hardship. Germany has been 
playing a similarly important role. To many Mongolian politicians and 
government officials, the United States would appear as the savor of new 
Mongolia and “major pillar” of its national security.180  
Since Mongolia transformed its political system, Japan’s assistance was 
invaluable during the economic hardship and the building of new democratic institutions.  
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However, Japan is also interested in being involved in the democracy-building process 
because it has a strong desire to have influence just north of China. For Mongolians, 
Japan’s robust economic and technological support was important in order to alter 
Mongolia’s Soviet-type economic systems and industrial bases. Certainly, Japan has been 
the strongest democracy and the U.S. ally in Asia, so the United States expects the 
Japanese unhesitant response or support in the region. Since Japan and China have been 
competing for economic dominance in Asia, Japan has been a potential “third neighbor” 
for Mongolia. 
Other powerful countries—Great Britain, France, Germany, and Canada—have 
been considered a “third neighbor” for Mongolia. Additionally, Turkey and India should 
not be forgotten due to their weight in regional politics and traditionally good relations 
with Mongolia. D. Ulambayar considers the economic dependence, import-oriented 
economy, underdeveloped national industrial base, infrastructure and technology, exports 
based on raw materials, large social welfare expenditure, landlocked geographical 
location, limited foreign direct investment, and location between two nuclear powers as 
the domestic prerequisites to develop and grow a third neighbor relationship in Mongolia.  
Mongolia’s requirements for a third neighbor are: champion the common values of 
humanity, democracy, market-oriented economy, and human rights; have a willingness to 
develop a comprehensive partnership; have no disputes between sides; demonstrate 
cultural awareness; respect the regulations of the UN; have equal perspectives on regional 
and international relations issues; and support regional and international organizations.181 
The third neighbor policy has been important for Mongolia’s foreign policy. Li 
Narangoa contends, “Although the partnership with Russia and China is often referred to 
as a ‘friendship partnership,’ that with the United States and Japan is referred to as a 
‘comprehensive partnership.’ It means that the latter countries will be partners not only in 
economics and trade but also regional politics and security.”182 
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3. Active Participation in Regional and International Activities 
International organizations are one pillar of providing security in Mongolia.  
Mongolia actively participates in regional and international activities in order to increase 
its reputation and influence. The Concept of Foreign Policy states that the third focus of 
Mongolia’s foreign policy activity shall be strengthening its position in Asia and securing 
constructive participation in the political and economic integration process in the region. 
The fourth focus shall be promoting cooperation with the United Nations Organization 
and its specialized organizations and with international financial and economic 
organizations.183Mongolia is a member of more than 40 regional and international 
organizations including the UN, WB, IMF, WTO, ADB, and NAM and is affiliated with 
140 multilateral agreements. Additionally, Mongolia has held an observer status in a 
number of organizations including Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which 
was established by the Chinese initiative.  Mongolia’s status in SCO is discussed later in 
this chapter.  
In order to avoid the influence of its two neighbors, Mongolia seeks assistance 
from the donor community instead of China and Russia during its transitional period 
between a centrally planned economy and a market-oriented economy. Mongolia became 
a member of the ADB and World Bank in February 1991, and they have been leading 
donors of the country. They have been concentrating on economic fostering and growth, 
urban development, promotion of governance, building a foundation for effective 
macroeconomic management, alleviating poverty, rehabilitation of infrastructure, and 
improving banking and enterprising systems.184 The main reason for mentioning these 
donor organizations is to emphasize that Mongolia has been attempting to receive 
assistance and grants from international organizations and donor communities, even 
though a large portion of them has come from its two neighbors, especially China.  
Mongolia also has been an active member of the UN. It has joined numerous 
agreements and banning treaties in regards to global disarmament and non-proliferation.  
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Mongolia’s declaration as a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) was a main contribution 
toward this goal. Sandwiched between two nuclear giants, Mongolia feels threatened 
because if either neighbor strikes against the other, Mongolia will be affected directly.  
The nuclear-weapon-free initiative is important not only for Mongolia but also for 
regional security. Therefore, when the Soviet troops were being withdrawn and Mongolia 
was setting up its new Constitution in 1992, Mongolia declared its territory to be a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone at the 47th session of the UN General Assembly. Although, 
this decision has been a difficult issue for Mongolians to prove and to have endorsed, the 
biggest nuclear powers in the world appreciated and respected it. Additionally, though it 
has not been recognized under international law, five official nuclear states jointly 
declared in October 2000 that they would provide assurance of Mongolia’s security.185 In 
addition, Mongolia has effectively contributed to UN peace operations since it sent the 
first two observers abroad in 2002. For a very short time, Mongolia became a dynamic 
contributor to the peace building and peacekeeping activities. Mongolia’s contribution is 
discussed later in the chapter.  
Mongolia is the newest member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which is 
the meeting of 26 members to discuss regional security issues. The ARF main objectives 
are to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of 
common interest and concern and to make significant contributions to efforts toward 
confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.186 The main 
reason Mongolia participates in this forum is the participation of its two immediate 
neighbors and potential third partners, such as the United States, Japan, South Korea, and 
India. This annual ministerial gathering, first held in 1994, provides a clear signal of the 
growing broader regional commitment to multilateral security dialogue throughout the 
Asia-Pacific.   
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However, Mongolia is still seeking membership in Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) and is not a member of other key regional organizations that 
primarily concentrate on economic cooperation, such as ASEAN Plus Three and the East 
Asia Summit (EAS). 
a. Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
Mongolia applied for observer status of the Shanghai SCO, and it was 
granted in 2004.  Vital aspects of the SCO’s agenda to Mongolia were cooperation in 
security, economics, and trade and transport networks in Central Asia. The most 
important aspect was the SCO principle that emphasizes “mutual respect of sovereignty, 
independence, territorial integrity of States and inviolability of state borders, non-
aggression, and non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in 
international relations, seeking no unilateral military superiority in adjacent area.”187 The 
main purpose of Mongolia participating in this Sino-Russian-led security organization is 
the effective usage of the principle that highlights “sovereignty,” “territorial integrity,” 
and “no unilateral military superiority in adjacent areas,” which Mongolia exactly wanted 
from its neighbors.188 As mentioned by Li Narangoa, this is one example of  how 
Mongolia has used a regional organization to maintain distance from its neighbors.  
Initially, the PRC did not welcome Mongolia into the SCO because China 
thought Mongolia was distinct from Central Asian states and did not have a necessity for 
the establishment of a secure peripheral area.  However, Mongolia’s open and 
multilateral policy and the improving relations with the United States, Japan, and Russia, 
who have been the strongest actors in the regional arena, led China to include Mongolia 
in the organization.  Moreover, the expansion of terrorism and its ambiguity of the origin 
along with ethnic separatist issues stimulated China to invite its northern neighbor.  
Mongolian leaders also agreed to be a part of the SCO in order to be aware of the 
immediate neighbors’ intentions in regional security building.    
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Mongolia is not seeking full-membership status in SCO.  The SCO 
stemmed from Shanghai Five security group in 2001 and it is comprised of China, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.  If Mongolia becomes a 
member of the organization, pressures from Russia and China would intensify with 
regards to implementing membership obligations.  Moreover, if Russia and China dissent 
on any issue, Mongolia will be forced to make a difficult choice between them.  It 
contradicts with Mongolia’s foreign policy principle of a nonaligned and neutral policy 
toward its immediate neighbors.   
According to the “Regulations on Observer Status in SCO,” observers 
have a right to attend open meetings and conferences, to participate in discussions 
without the right to vote, and to deliver a speech or circulate written statements at 
meetings of the SCO institutions with ten days’ prior notice. Nevertheless, observer states 
do not have the right to participate in preparation and signing of documents and decisions 
of the organization. In addition, observers do not take part in formulating decisions of 
SCO institutions.189 
The SCO remains the world’s only regional security mechanism without 
direct U.S. participation. Therefore, the United States has been suspicious about the real 
agenda of the organization, and Washington assesses that China and Russia are 
expanding their spheres of influence in Central Asia through the organization. This is not 
without basis because member states are trying to develop military cooperation and trust 
by reducing misperceptions and preventing future conflicts. This agenda includes 
prevention of other militaries’ presence in the region, thus SCO has an objective to limit 
U.S. political and military expansion in the region. This definitely bears constraint to 
Mongolia’s aspiration to build a more close relationship with the United States. 
Particularly, Mongolia’s desire to build a professional military capable of doing 
multilateral tasks engages it with the leading military forces in the world—a membership 
status could halt this trend.   
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Since its establishment, the SCO’s role has been gradually increasing, and 
now its agenda covers not only border and regional security, counter-terrorism, and trade, 
but also energy, transportation, environmental protection, and technological and cultural 
exchange.190 Since Russia and China play the largest role in its foreign trade, Mongolia’s 
observer status in the SCO gives it the great advantage of seeing how the SCO member 
countries consider providing security in the region. Although it is impossible to acquire 
all necessary information regarding Russia and China’s policy toward their neighbors, 
Mongolia could experience the relations between powerful and weak countries in the 
SCO’s environment. With the exception of Kazakhstan, other members in the 
organization are facing similar circumstances that Mongolia has been experiencing, such 
as landlocked location, much smaller population, economic dependence, and having 
lingering fear that of assimilation through settled border disputes. 
b. Participation in Peace Support and other Multinational 
Operations   
Mongolia established an office in 1998 to manage professionalization of 
the Mongolian Armed Forces and to plan, prepare, and send troops to international 
peacekeeping and multinational operations. The State Great Khural passed the law of 
“Participation of military and civilian policy personnel in UN peace operations” in 2002 
that regulates and provides a legal environment for sending personnel abroad. The law 
regulates coordination and other responsibilities for Mongolian government agencies, 
including decision-making procedures for participation in peacekeeping operations. Also, 
the legislation provides opportunities for military and police personnel to participate in 
non-UN missions, such as coalition and disaster-relief operations. By 2002, Mongolia 
had established the domestic legal basis for participation, had started to develop national 
expertise, and was seeking opportunities in peace support operations.191 
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It was an entirely new direction of development for the country’s armed 
forces, and since 2003, Mongolian troops took part in several peacekeeping and observer 
missions and sent ten rotations to Iraq and MTT to Afghanistan. Mongolia first sent two 
military observers to Congo in 2002. Today, Mongolia ranks 38th out of the top 100 
troop-contributing UN member states.192 Since 2002, more than 1,000 Mongolian troops 
have been in operation in Iraq and Afghanistan, 70 troops have been in the peacekeeping 
operation in the Balkans, and more than 1,500 troops have participated UN peace 
operations in Sierra Leone (UNMIL) and Chad (MINURCAT). Mongolia sent the first 
independent battalion-size force to MINURCAT in 2009.   
Jargalsaikhan Mendee notes that the warrior spirit, adaptability in various 
environments, and Mongolia’s friendly relations with other countries are unique 
characteristics associated with Mongolia’s military that afford them many opportunities 
to contribute to international peace support operations.193 By involving all these 
activities, Mongolia is enabled to raise its stature among international communities;  
many countries are starting to recognize Mongolia’s intention to keep peace and stability. 
The Mongolian military realized the impossibility of providing security in terms of 
military forces. Therefore, military and civilian leaders are agreed to using the military 
for the support of the overall national policy through the contribution to UN 
peacekeeping and other international and humanitarian operations. 
B. POLICY OPTIONS AND CHOICES 
Mongolia has been enjoying the implementation of an independent foreign policy 
after seven decades of tutelage from the Soviet Union. However, its landlocked location, 
small demography, and underdeveloped economy still engender anxiety within the 
Mongolian people. One can easily find facts that China has been at the heart of the 
Mongolian people’s concern. Tom Ginsburg made the following statement: 
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Distrust of China runs deep in the population. Despite a decade of double-
digit growth in China that would seem to render it a natural source of 
markets and economic cooperation, Mongolians commonly assert that 
China is an unattractive partner.194   
Though Ginsburg mentioned it fifteen years ago, credibility of this assumption 
still exists. Therefore, Mongolia should maintain its current policy of developing 
democratic principles and a national economy, and growing friendly relations with other 
countries, which would raise the stature of Mongolia, while Russia and China are 
preoccupied by domestic issues.   
China’s significant military rise and modernization, with an ambiguous objective, 
concerns not only Mongolia but also the regional powers.  Even the United States has 
great concern, though it is still far further advanced than China. Shambaugh claims,  
Even though some countries remain unsure of China’s long-term 
ambitions and are adopting hedging policies against the possibility of a 
more aggressive China, the majority of Asian states currently view China 
as more benign than malign and are accommodating themselves to its 
rise.195  
Even so, Mongolia should not repeat its historical mistake of occasionally leaning 
toward one of its two neighbors; therefore, it should maintain pursuing an independent, 
neutral, multi-polar but friendly foreign policy. This practice includes Mongolia’s 
friendly but nonaligning policy toward its two neighbors as the highest priority, followed 
by active participation in the regional and international activities, efforts to seek reliable 
third neighbors, and attempts to have itself recognized as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. 
1. Political 
Due to many pragmatic reasons, Mongolia’s security has been shaped by its two 
neighbors and their relations. When relations with one of them or their relations with 
each other deteriorate, Mongolia’s security is in danger. In other words, balance of power 
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between its two neighbors shapes Mongolia’s foreign policy options. Mongolia, 
therefore, should implement measures to maintain and strengthen this balance of power. 
It should be implemented by supporting China and Russia’s role in regional affairs as 
responsible leaders. Certainly, Moscow and Beijing’s stature in the region is enormous; 
thus, Mongolia should politely remind them, specifically China, of the responsibility of 
powerful countries in regional affairs. While maintaining friendly relations with Moscow 
and Beijing, Mongolia should manifest the aspiration of keeping this friendly 
environment. However, Mongolia should also freely express that it would not solely rely 
on its two neighbors for providing security. Maintaining proper distance from them and 
attempting to reduce dependency will be another measure for Mongolia. Active 
participation in regional and international activities stem from this notion.   
Mongolia has been an active and effective participant in regional and international 
activities. Ravdan Bold makes the following statement:  
The capacity of the small nations to survive and exist is determined by 
their ability to take full advantage of the mechanisms of international 
relations and by their internal unity and harmony. Given the present 
features of international relations, small nations have an unprecedented 
opportunity to advance their national interests within the framework of 
multilateral cooperation irrespective of the difference in the balance of 
forces.196  
Due to globalization and the development of information technology, the speed of 
information has become enormous and even tiny news in small states spreads easily. 
Besides international organizations, the number of responsible powers is increasing and 
small states subtly have used this opportunity. Additionally, small states are actively 
involved with certain organizations in order to provide security for themselves. Their 
dynamic has been enormous because these organizations’ main agenda is the economic, 
political, and security issues of small states. Moreover, a multilateral approach gives 
more opportunity to small states than bilateral relations between strong and weak states, 
which was ubiquitous in history.   
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Mongolia certainly needs third neighbors. Not only the United States, but also 
other countries would be significant for balancing power if China or Russia threatens 
Mongolia. Mongolia implements independent policy when issues do not contradict with 
its two neighbors’ interests. For example, Mongolia sent its small contingent to Iraq, and 
it was a part of Mongolia’s independent policy to support the greatest potential third 
neighbor—the United States. Additionally, this involvement was a manifestation of 
Mongolia’s willingness to cooperate with third partners, though Moscow and Beijing 
opposed. Mongolians consider the United States as a savior of the democratic 
achievement in the country.  Japan definitely maintains a major role of providing crucial 
economic assistance and loans.  As elaborated in the Former Prime Minister of Mongolia 
Enkhbayar’s speech, Mongolia refers to India as a third neighbor in a cultural sense, to 
Korea and Japan as third neighbors in economic terms, and to the United States as a third 
neighbor in strategic terms.197 Mongolia could exploit its good relations with North 
Korea to improve the regional security and stability. Moreover, an active involvement 
improves Mongolia’s reputation not only in the region, but also in the global community.  
Lastly, even though it is difficult for a single country to achieve a nuclear-
weapon-free zone, Mongolia should continue its efforts toward recognition by other 
states. History experienced the edge of the potential nuclear war between Mongolia’s 
direct neighbors. During that period, Mongolia was under direct threat of nuclear 
annihilation by the two neighbors’ confrontation. Therefore, it is not enough to announce 
its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Mongolia needs to intensify the attempts to be 
recognized by the international community. It is not the best solution to provide security 
or prevent nuclear attacks, but it gives opportunity for contribution to non-proliferation 
and banning nuclear tests. In this case, Mongolia’s declaration as a nuclear-weapon-free 
zone will strengthen national security.   
2. Military 
Obviously, Mongolia could not overwhelm its two neighbors by any means. 
Exploiting incremental double-digit economic growth, China has been implementing 
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ambitious military modernization for the past two decades. As China pursues a policy to 
improve its military qualitatively, Russia has been facing a number of difficulties, 
including a shortage of funding to maintain its military modernization and 
transformation. During recent years, China has been fielding experimental (Special 
Operations Forces) units, and the PLA’s most powerful ground forces are still located in 
Beijing and Shenyang Military Regions. Therefore, Mongolia should continue to build 
compact, capable, and professionally oriented military.   
Since a small states’ survival largely depends on its educational, scientific, 
cultural, intellectual, and information potentials, Mongolia should possess modern, 
professional, and smart military forces. Recent years experienced the broad development 
of military foreign education, and Mongolian military personnel have been receiving a 
professional military education in the United States, France, United Kingdom, South 
Korea, China, Canada, Germany, Russian, and Turkey. Mongolian Armed Forces should 
increase the number of specialists in state-of-the-art technology. Particularly, it should 
train more officers and NCOs in EW and IW and teach classes on RMA. Mongolia 
should continue to build professional NCO corps.  During recent years, the number of 
NCOs in the Armed Forces is increasing, and the contracted soldiers are becoming an 
inseparable part of the professional military in Mongolia.  Along with the increase in 
numbers, the responsibility of NCOs is dramatically extending and increasing, and 
Mongolia should maintain this track.   
Mongolia’s self-defense system should be based on the integrated defense system 
relying on territorial defense. 198 This is an integrated defense system built not only on 
the armed forces, but is an organized arrangement with the broad involvement of citizens. 
It is a defense system designed to independently oppose and neutralize foreign armed and 
limited aggressions, starting from the state borders and extending deep into the 
hinterland.199 Therefore, Mongolia should implement a defense policy to build local 
forces with proper training, to locate defense resources based on this system, and acquire 
certain military equipment and weaponries suitable for the system. Due to its large 
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territory and scarce habitation, Mongolia should possess a current and efficient air 
defense system in conjunction with compact, mobile, and professional troops who are 
capable of planning and executing multilateral tasks. Additionally, other military 
hardware, such as air transportation assets, high-mobility vehicles, and self-support 
assets, should not be ignored.  
The armed forces should be a sustaining method of providing security, using 
diplomacy and negotiations.  One way of doing this has been Mongolia’s contribution to 
UN peace operations and other multinational operations.  Due to Mongolia’s participation 
in Iraq and Afghanistan operations, many countries have become familiar with it and its 
state reputation has been rising sharply.  In addition, Mongolian peacekeepers in Sierra 
Leon and Chad and observers in various countries were esteemed by their devotion, 
professionalization, stamina, and discipline.  Consequently, the Mongolian military 




The PRC has pursued an ambitious program to modernize its military, aware of 
lagging far behind the modern Western militaries, especially the United States armed 
forces. The modernization process has the main objective of filling the gap between the 
PLA and advanced militaries in the world and transforming the PLA into a decisive, 
modern and effective fighting force. The PLA ground forces still concentrate north of 
Beijing and has fielded more professional and special forces and its mobility has 
increased greatly. PLAAF has acquired more capable and modern planes with greater 
range, and the PLAN builds blue-water capability. As a result, China is developing joint 
forces with great power projection capability. Though many Western analysts suggest 
China still lags behind the leading military nations, it possesses a formidable threat to its 
neighboring countries. In particular, Mongolia has been under the direct threat of the 
looming Chinese military forces. 
It is hard to protect Mongolia using only its military. The Mongolian military 
could be a tool to backup the national policy of maintaining harmony with others. So far, 
China surpasses Mongolia in every field—economy, demography, technology, and 
military. Therefore, Mongolia implements multilateral policy while its relations with 
Moscow and Beijing receive highest priority. In other words, Mongolia no longer relies 
on a single source to provide security. The term security here includes all aspects, such as 
military, economy, culture, and ethnicity. Unfortunately, Mongolia’s desire to implement 
multilateral policy apparently contradicts the interests of its two neighbors, especially the 
growing interests of China’s economy, military, and politics. Thus, an indirect threat 
from China is imminent, and this perspective is manifested in several aspects. 
Credible reasons support the notion that China poses an imminent threat to 
Mongolia. First, Mongolia is landlocked between two nuclear powers, China is still a 
communist state, and Russia is not truly democratic. Second, Mongolia’s economic 
backbone has been animal husbandry for years, but it has been replaced by extracting and 
exploiting natural resources. Recent discoveries show that Mongolia has rich natural 
resources, such as copper, gold, coal and uranium. Unfortunately, Mongolia lacks the 
 102
financial and technological capability to use these resources, so its mining development 
strongly relies on foreign direct investment. Both China and Russia have special interests 
to exploit them.  In particular, with China’s quickly growing economy and energy needs, 
Beijing pays special attention to these resources and does not want other countries 
involved. Third, Mongolia has been almost completely dependent on commodities from 
China and petroleum products from Russia. China is a big player in the global market, 
and Russia is one of the biggest oil and natural gas exporters to many European Union 
states. In contrast, Mongolia’s economy is underdeveloped, and no other economy is 
dependent on Mongolia. Since the PRC places highest priority on safeguarding the 
Communist regime and Communist policy, its new tasks include protecting Chinese 
economic interests. In other words, China threatens to use force, if not really use it, to 
secure natural resources essential for its quickly growing economy.   
The Chinese common perception of the U.S. policy toward Asia is of a 
“hegemonic” approach, and its basic method of dealing with this dominance has been 
simply a resistance. While resisting U.S. dominance, China continues to pursue a 
peaceful policy that attracts its East Asian neighbors, including Mongolia. A main 
objective has been to deny a uni-polar world led by the United States and to create multi-
polar world. Another assumption of China’s in regards of the United States is the 
perception of being encircled by U.S. power and influence.  Therefore, China is definitely 
displeased by Mongolia’s attempts to create close relations with the United States, and 
certainly dislikes growing military interactions between Mongolia and the United States. 
Moreover, China will not welcome intensifying Mongolia-Japan relations. Due to the 
historical incidents China experienced during the WWII and steer Chinese nationalism 
against Japanese influence in Asia.  Japan’s attempt to gain a permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council was overtly and dramatically opposed by Beijing. For this reason, China 
was dissatisfied by the Mongolia’s withdrawal of its attempt to gain this seat in order to 
support Japan.   
The research on international relations theory in this thesis suggests that the most 
applicable theory would be to balance against the power of Mongolia’s direct neighbors 
with third neighbors, including states and regional and international organizations. 
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However, Mongolia should avoid cooperation with certain issues that are directly related 
to or conflict with Moscow and Beijing’s interests. This does not mean Mongolia simply 
accepts China and Russia’s interests while making decisions. Therefore, balancing should 
combine with appropriate aspects of other theories, such as neutrality, preventive 
diplomacy, and liberalization.   
China’s direct threat to Mongolia, however, is unlikely for the following reasons: 
First, China is concentrating on its economic development and other security issues, such 
as the Taiwan Strait issue and disputes in the South China Sea. Second, in order to keep a 
peaceful context for its economic achievement and raise its international stature, China 
will continue a peaceful rise for some time and certainly will continue good relations with 
its neighbors. Third, many powers including the United States want China to be a 
responsible power that shares responsibility to keep and improve stability and order in the 
region and world. In addition, China is eager to stay on its current path of becoming a 
global hub for commodity production and attracting foreign direct investment, while 
enjoying double digit GDP growth annually. Fourth, China’s largest rivalry in the Asia-
Pacific region is Russia, which struggles with its domestic issues and economic recovery. 
Fifth, the United States is the sole super-power with true global power projection 
capability, and China lags far behind the United States. Consequently, Mongolia enjoys 
relatively peaceful relations with both of its neighbors and takes advantage of China’s 
growing economic achievement. It is, however, uncertain for Mongolia and other 
countries how long this good relationship will last.   
The implications of the Chinese military rise, therefore, are enormous for 
Mongolian security. Though a direct threat or military attack is unlikely, the indirect 
threat through economic, political, and cultural approaches could be gigantic. China will 
implement policy to effectively influence and disrupt Mongolia’s independent and 
multilateral policy under the umbrella of the rising military significance. In particular, 
Chinese economic interest and influence in Mongolia is imminent and may absorb 
Mongolia’s small economy if Mongolia does not implement proper economic policy. As 
long as the PLA remains the greatest potential tool for the legitimacy of the CCP as a 
“party army,” China poses great danger to Mongolia’s security. All the security aspects 
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stated in the Concept of the National Security of Mongolia—such as the existence of 
Mongolia, economic security, scientific and technological security, security of 
information, security of Mongolian civilization, and security of the population—may 
easily be threatened. 
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